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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
Katrina L. Maggiulli 
 
Master of Arts 
 
Environmental Studies Program 
 
June 2016 
 
Title: Going Feral: The Utopian Horror of Human-Animal Hybrids 
 
 
According to the material feminist corpus, namely Stacy Alaimo’s concept of 
trans-corporeality, material flows and interconnectivity between humans and their 
environment insists that the human body has never been atomistic, but rather a porous 
figure that continually interacts/intra-acts with its environment. The recent 
biotechnological boom allowing for the production of human-animal hybrids (chimeras) 
provides the kind of visualization of these interconnectivities that can help instigate a 
reconception of the human—as not human at all, but rather posthuman. This study looks 
at the presence of these human-animal hybrids in popular art media, specifically: the 
horror film, Splice (Dir. Natali 2009); the YA novel, Inhuman (Falls 2013); and the 
comic, Sweet Tooth (Lemire 2009-2013). This thesis argues that the human-animal 
hybrid figure exhibits utopian horror, or the use of horror to produce new, better, ways of 
conceptualizing human-animal relationships, ones that acknowledge our already 
posthuman plurality of self.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Monsters are our children. They can be pushed to the farthest margins of 
geography and discourse, hidden away at the edges of the world and in the 
forbidden recesses of our mind, but they always return. And when they 
come back, they bring not just a fuller knowledge of our place in history 
and the history of knowing our place, but they bear self-knowledge, 
human knowledge—and a discourse all the more sacred as it arises from 
the Outside. (Cohen 20) 
 
Folk Essentialism and the Trans-corporeal Posthuman 
The boundaries between humans and animals have long been fraught with 
anxiety. In the Western epistemic tradition, we have a near obsessive need to distinguish 
ourselves as different from the “brute” natures of animals, a need that triggers fears of 
boundary crossing or blurring. These anxieties have redoubled in recent years due to the 
rapid progression of biotechnology and the seemingly limitless horizons made possible 
through ongoing developments in genetic engineering. These biotechnologies include the 
potential combination of human and non-human animal1 genetics to create hybrid 
species. Such phenomena, commonly referred to as “chimeras,” are received with 
extremely mixed responses. Some countries, including the UK, see the potential these 
hybrids have for medical research and have legalized them for this purpose, while many 
others remain vehemently opposed to these kinds of experiments (Sample; Snyder). And 
the debate over the acceptability of these hybrids seems to have less to do with 
biologically based arguments and more to do with folk essentialist conceptions of 
species.  
                                                
1 For brevity’s sake I will from here on refer to non-human animals as simply animals. 
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In Jason Scott Robert and Francoise Baylis’s influential and oft-cited 2003 article 
“Crossing Species Boundaries,” they note that despite essentialism being “vanishingly 
rare” in contemporary biological practice, it is established in us long before we are 
introduced to scientific biology (5). The human is thus popularly perceived to possess 
essential qualities that make it Homo sapiens and not any other species—a conception 
that ignores the inherent fluidity of species, as made evident by Darwinian evolution, as 
well as the extreme genetic relatedness of humans and other animals.2 And this 
misconception is notably evident in public opinion despite its disavowal by biologists. As 
Robert and Baylis observe: 
 [N]otwithstanding the claim that biologically species are fluid, people 
believe that species identities and boundaries are indeed fixed and in fact 
make everyday moral decisions on the basis of this belief. (6) 
Thus, despite developments in biology that have expanded the boundaries of the human, 
it seems “that the possible permeability of species boundaries is not open to public debate 
insofar as novel part-human beings are concerned” (6). 
By solidifying the boundaries of the human, folk essentialism helps construct and 
maintain the nature/culture divide, and produces an intensified fear of crossing these 
boundaries—including the boundary between the human and animal. As Stacy Alaimo 
observes, “[g]enetic engineering, like Darwinism, evokes tremendous anxiety about the 
fact that humans are inextricably bound to nature” (“Discomforting Creatures” 238). That 
our genes can be tinkered with just as easily, and the mysteries of the human body can be 
unraveled just as readily, as those of other animals, negates conceptions of the human as 
                                                
2 Humans share a considerable amount of their DNA with other animals, and in some cases, such as with chimpanzees, the human 
genome only differs by 1.2-1.6% (Robert & Baylis 4).  
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apart from, and superior to, other creatures. And even before genetic engineering, 
Darwinism had already established these connections by placing humans within a 
community of descent, and thus denying their exceptionalism. Stacy Alaimo and other 
scholars have taken up Darwin’s theory to argue for a different perception of the human 
as one in constant flux and embedded in its environment:  
Demonstrating that the structure of the human body is comparable to that 
of animals and that animal behavior is comparable to that of the human, 
Darwin forges a scientific and philosophical ‘posthumanism’ in which 
there are no solid demarcations between human and animal and in which 
the human is coextensive with the emergent natural/cultural world. (Bodily 
Natures 151) 
She goes on to argue that, by “exposing the human as a corporeal amalgamation of 
creatures both at hand and across vast temporal distances, [Darwin] may have given us 
our first glimpse of the always already ‘posthuman,’ a stance that insists upon our 
immersion within worldly material agencies” (158).  
It can thus be argued, that through an approach that acknowledges both biological 
and theoretical conceptions of the human, we can establish an understanding of the 
human as not human at all, but rather posthuman. The material flows and 
interconnectivity between humans and their environment (including the bodies of other 
animals), what Alaimo calls trans-corporeality, insists that the human body has never 
been a unit unto itself, but rather a porous one that continually interacts/intra-acts with 
the world around it. This conception of the human not only overthrows essentialism, but 
also necessitates we “radically rethink materiality, the very ‘stuff’ of bodies and natures” 
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(“Trans-Corporeal Feminisms” 242). And while working through this interconnectivity 
with the environment and inherent relatedness to other animals is clearly an essential 
project for accepting a posthuman reality, these flows lack the kind of direct visual cues 
that humans tend to rely on. How do you accept connectivity with your environment 
when you can’t see the intra-action taking place? This problem has been particularly felt 
in the context of pollutants and toxins—even though they might be impossible to see with 
the naked eye, this does not change the way they can affect your body. And these visual 
cues become doubly important when you are working against ingrained folk essentialist 
epistemologies. The evidence for an alternative approach must have more than a 
scholar’s support to alter this kind of perspective.  
I argue that the recent biotechnological boom allowing the production of human-
animal hybrids provides the kind of visualization of these interconnectivities that can help 
instigate this project. While Alaimo observes that Darwin’s work underscored the 
physical similarities between humans and animals to demonstrate their relatedness, I 
believe these similarities may be helpful for understanding relatedness, but ultimately are 
too distant for layman consideration. The huge temporal separation between a common 
ancestor and the present-day species weakens the potential for robust, and far-reaching, 
perceptions of kinship. This appeal to physical similarities could generate moral interest 
in a particular species, but it does not demand consideration in the way a human-animal 
hybrid can. The visions of boundary-blurring represented in these creatures are so 
frightening and unsettling for a public still clinging to folk essentialist conceptions of 
species, that they will force us to reconsider the lines of the human. Our fear can thus be 
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used as a tool to draw us in to reconsider what we are actually afraid of and if these fears 
can be sustained once interrogated.  
 
Fear: The Hybrid in Horror 
Born of a generation where biotechnology has seemed to race ahead of our ethical 
frameworks, leaving us uncertain and afraid of what scientists might cook up next, the 
human-animal hybrid is undoubtedly a monster of our time. As Jeffrey Jerome Cohen 
notes, “[t]he monstrous body is pure culture. A construct and a projection, the monster 
exists only to be read: the monstrum is etymologically ‘that which reveals,’ ‘that which 
warns’” (4). These figures certainly necessitate discussions of what alterations to living 
creatures is acceptable—what level of tampering with “natural” forces is acceptable—and 
they can serve as not only an embodiment of moral quandaries over such biotechnologies, 
but also about our moral understanding of other animals. Robert and Baylis observed the 
ways these novel organisms unearth our current lack of consensus on moral obligations to 
even some of those “among us who are undeniably biologically human, as well as … to a 
range of nonhuman animals” (Robert & Baylis 9). The human-animal hybrid figure is 
thus a monstrous embodiment of both our fears of relatedness to animals as well as our 
uncertainties about the limitations of our current ethical frameworks. 
But these monsters can also provide a “pleasurable sense of identification” 
(“Discomforting Creatures” 294). The success of horror narratives featuring such 
monstrous figures often relies on this connection with the monstrous—“a visceral 
identification in which the boundaries of [the audience’s] own bodies seem to dissolve,” 
allowing the viewer to experience connection with a figure that operates beyond 
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categorization (294). As Alaimo notes in her analysis of monstrous natures in 
contemporary horror, “[p]erhaps the horrific but pleasurable sense of the ‘melting of 
corporeal boundaries’ … can catalyze some sort of resistance to the desire to demarcate, 
discipline, and eradicate monstrous natures” (294). Thus, the monster can also operate as 
a desirable representation of a move beyond categorization and separation of humans 
from nature, to a state of connectivity. And the human-animal hybrid can help reestablish 
the human into Darwin’s community of descent—into a community of kinship with other 
animals. This grapples with the human existential fears of isolation and insignificance. As 
Deborah Bird Rose observes in Wild Dog Dreaming: “If we are like [animals], do we lose 
our sense of having a unique origin and destiny? If we are not like them, are we isolated? 
If we do not belong with them, with whom do we belong?” (48). There is a fear here of 
both disconnect and connection that must be grappled with, as the converging fear and 
desire complicate the potentiality for acknowledging and incorporating these narratives of 
interrelatedness into our conceptions of self. As philosopher Mary Midgley observes in 
The Myths We Live By: “To think of ourselves seriously as animals is to regard the other 
animals as our kin; it inevitably leads us in some degree to welcome them, to identify 
with them, to see their cause as our own. That, indeed, is just what people find both 
attractive and frightening about this way of thinking” (138). 
In response to these fears, Deborah Bird Rose developed what she calls ecological 
existentialism, which “pulls together two major shifts in worldview: the end of certainty 
and the end of atomism. From certainty the shift is to uncertainty. From atomism the shift 
is to connectivity” (2-3). Identifying with the human-animal “monster” would require 
both of these shifts. The dissolution of boundaries between the human and the animal (the 
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human and the environment) instigates uncertainty and produces connectivity—both vital 
changes that must foreground the acceptance of the human as an already posthuman 
being.  In Stacy Alaimo’s book Bodily Natures, she argues for a similar “posthuman 
environmental ethics in which the flows, interchanges, and interrelations between human 
corporeality and the more-than-human world resist the ideological forces of 
disconnection” (Bodily Natures 142). I contend that the visually compelling human-
animal hybrid invokes an acknowledgement of inherent relatedness, and thus 
interconnectivity between the human and its environment. It is the uncertainty that comes 
with this dissolution of boundaries (and production of connectivity) that ultimately 
becomes the most challenging, and frightening, aspect of this shift. 
 
Desire: The Utopian Hybrid 
This fear of uncertainty is evident even within the context of biotechnology’s 
utopian driving force, and the idealistic goals of human-animal hybrid research—many of 
which find their roots in evolutionary theory. In Brian Stableford’s article 
“Biotechnology and Utopia,” he asserts that in the aftermath of Charles Darwin’s 
publication of The Origin of Species, many speculative writers were convinced that “no 
ideal state could possibly be attained until the current limitations of the human body 
could be conclusively set aside” (Stableford 189). While at the time it was mere 
speculation that evolutionary forces would make the necessary changes, as biotechnology 
advanced, “it was widely realized that human biology was a given that did not necessarily 
have to be accepted” (189). What was once considered science fiction is now not only 
possible, but is actually in practice. This is especially true within the Transhumanism 
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movement, whose primary goal is to overcome human mortality, which some believe 
could be possible as soon as 2045 (Istvan). In some contemporary circles, however, 
humans themselves are often seen as the “greatest obstacle to utopia,” where only our 
genetic alteration to more closely resemble other, humbler, species, or our annihilation 
altogether will restore the planet to a kind of eco-utopian state (Jendrysik 36). In the 1996 
film adaptation of The Island of Dr. Moreau, Moreau explains that “in order to eradicate 
the ‘monstrous elements of the human psyche,’ we must accept a ‘snout or hoof here or 
there’” (qtd. in “Discomforting Creatures” 293). Here, the limitations of the human are 
seen as surmountable through a reintegration of animal genetics, a move that aims not to 
elevate the human further above nature, but rather reestablish its place within it. 
While these assertions may or may not be true, the potential for bio-engineered 
fixes for human health, food shortages, and energy crises are undoubtedly real and 
currently in use. From Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), to vaccines, biofuels, 
and medical treatments, biotechnology has reached into many different controversial 
areas, but many of these controversies have been (largely) overturned and the technology 
naturalized. Even technologies that cross the human-animal divide have been widely 
adopted—where the use of pig heart valves for human heart repair was once perceived as 
monstrous, it is now commonplace. But as Stableford observes, despite the “awe and 
gratitude” we may have for the biotechnological advancements of the past, “we are [still] 
bound … to regard the biotechnological anticipations and discoveries of our own day 
with the profoundest anxiety and suspicion” (194). And while there are many human-
animal xenotransplantation procedures that have been naturalized, these species blends 
are relatively superficial. Even projects that inject human genetic material into pig 
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kidneys to improve transplant success do not exhibit outward alterations to a person’s 
appearance3 that indicate this species crossover.  Nor do they significantly alter the 
individual’s genome, making their initial controversy less unavoidably contentious than 
that of the more visually evident contemporary hybrids. And these controversies are often 
characterized by what Stableford calls, “a reflexive tidal wave of neurotic anxiety and 
blind, unreasoning terror” (200). And this terror is most readily felt when these 
biotechnologies can be clearly and visually demarcated from the “norm.” 
 
Visualizing the Posthuman in Popular Culture 
Because these human-animal hybrids provide such a visually compelling locus for 
conceptualizing the Darwinian posthuman discussed above, they can become a key figure 
in the shift in public consciousness from folk essentialism to a more fluid conception of 
the human, and other species. These biotechnological developments necessitate we 
rethink the bounds of the human and acknowledge our own inherent posthumanity and 
interrelatedness with other animals. It was much easier to ignore the similarities between 
humans and other animals when visual and linguistic boundaries could be easily drawn—
these obviously hybrid figures complicate that. And while significant shifts have been 
made in academic and research fields, the broader public has maintained its hold on folk 
essentialism, which is why for this project I am intentionally turning my focus to the 
“low” art forms of popular culture texts, rather than “high” literary or art culture. I find 
the best indicators of these shifts are more likely to be found in low arts, as the audience 
they are working to please is the broader populous, thus its themes are anchored in what 
interests the public most and what messages they would like most to hear.  
                                                
3 Nor do they alter the outward appearance of the pig donor. 
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This is not to say that popular arts can’t question the status quo and push cultural 
perceptions in new directions, far from it. I find them to be in a better place to enact these 
changes, as they approach the general public on common ground—in the pages of an 
easy-read comic, at a horror film, or through a page-turning young adult adventure. From 
this common ground, they can then push their readers or viewers a step farther into 
unknown territory. The presence of the human-animal hybrids in popular art forms 
indicates the broader public’s need to respond to developments in the scientific and 
academic realms—it is an acknowledgement that the human/animal and self/other 
distinctions that folk essentialism puts so much stock in need to be reconceived.  
And the ethical debate of the human-animal chimeras in the scientific world is a 
key place to engage with these concepts, in part, simply because its visually hybrid 
figures can easily translate and establish themselves into pop culture narratives. Certainly 
there are other places for grappling with these issues in popular culture, but I find this 
undeniable blend of the human and animal to be particularly fruitful for this kind of work. 
With the contentious debate over chimera research so firmly focused within the material 
body of the hybrid, it opens a door for discussing the ways the human is already 
posthuman—a co-constitutive intra-actor of its environment. As Donna Haraway remarks 
in the context of companion species: “it is a mistake to see the alterations of dogs’ bodies 
and minds as biological and the changes in human bodies and lives, for example in the 
emergence of herding or agricultural societies, as cultural, and so not about co-evolution” 
(Haraway 31). The body is a key place of this turmoil over self/other distinctions, as to 
acknowledge that the “other” influences your physical self, is to acknowledge that you 
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have never been in control and thus your “self” is just as much a product of “external” 
environmental actors as your own actions.  
This movement supports the challenge of Deborah Bird Rose’s ecological 
existentialism with its combined shifts towards the threatening, but freeing, embrace of 
uncertainty, and the welcoming, but potentially deflating, expansion to connectivity. The 
human-animal hybrid craze can be thus used as a tool to build towards a new posthuman 
hybrid consciousness that interacts with these shifts towards connectivity and uncertainty. 
Without this visualization, I contend, we are unlikely to make the radical shifts in our 
conceptions of the human that are necessary. These human-animal visions of boundary-
blurring are so shocking they force us to reconsider the lines of the “human,” and enable 
us to move towards a new hybrid consciousness that simultaneously dissolves boundaries 
between the self/other and acknowledges and honors difference. We need to work 
through the initial horror of these figures in order to move towards an acceptance and 
embrace of the posthuman. 
 
The Utopian Horror of the Human-Animal Hybrid 
In my selection of primary narratives for this work, the posthuman’s challenge to 
Western notions of the human-animal binary necessitated I keep my range within 
Western narratives. All the narratives chosen are by Canadian or American artists 
grappling with present-day or near-future intentional constructions of the human-animal 
hybrid. I do not look at narratives in which human-animal hybrids are results of magic or 
supernatural causes (like werewolves), but rather stay within the tradition of science-
fiction and the potentiality of current science. While I think future analyses of these 
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fantastical works could be valuable to understandings of the posthuman, the place of the 
science-fiction hybrid figures as “extraordinary” figures in an “ordinary” world means 
they “breach the norms of ontological propriety” (Carroll 16). The “ordinary” nature of 
fantasy hybrids in their “extraordinary” world makes them less shocking and thus, 
potentially, less immediately compelling and provocative. I also intentionally spread my 
selected narratives from across key popular culture media: film, YA fiction, and comics. 
This spread allows for a broader reach in the popular consciousness, thus indicating the 
ways these narratives are pervasive in many different arenas. In regards to this media 
variety, I have endeavored to conduct my analyses of each narrative within each 
respective genre’s own tradition of criticism, paying particular attention to the unique 
aesthetic qualities—both productive and potentially hindering—for each. 
Chapter II, “’We Crossed a line—things got confused.’ Meeting the Monster in 
the Horror Film, Splice,” explores the role of fear and shock in Vincenzo Natali’s 2009 
monster movie to instigate discussion about broadly unexamined conceptions of human-
animal interrelationships. Employing Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s seven theses of monster 
theory, I look at the ways the film itself toys with monstrous hybridity through its genre-
blending, and the role its human-animal hybrid monster, Dren, serves to complicate and 
confuse the seemingly arbitrary demarcations between spaces and identities. I look 
particularly at Natali’s use of the aesthetics of color to first demarcate between these 
categories, and then to complicate them, further collapsing the differences and distances 
between them.  
Chapter III, “Feral or Free? Uncaging the Posthuman in the YA novel Inhuman” 
builds off of this foundation of horror to indicate the ways individuals can work through 
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these fears to come to an understanding of connectivity and an acceptance of uncertainty 
in life more broadly. The “ferals” of Kat Falls’s 2013 YA novel provide a key visual 
rendition of the posthuman hybrid—one constructed through a viral transduction of 
genetic material which thus reinforces both the vulnerability of uninfected characters, as 
well as the material embeddedness of these figures in an agential world. This 
vulnerability instigates the acceptance of uncertainty and the embrace of language and 
stories that are materially situated, reinforcing connection between the individuals and the 
material reality around (and within) them. The feral also provides a lens for interrogating 
the ways we are already posthuman—that the human-animal binary is truly arbitrary—as 
the uninfected characters find their own inherent “wildness” without the use of the virus. 
In Chapter IV, “’Man’s time was done.’ The Posthuman Ecotopia of Jeff Lemire’s 
Sweet Tooth,” the posthuman hybrid figure is explored as the foundation for a new 
ecotopian society. The unique hybrid form of the comic book is used to construct 
material continuity between the humans and animals (and hybrids) within the narrative. 
The format also provides a place to look at the materiality of language and symbolism, 
where bodies become messages and language is expressed through flesh. The hybridity of 
form and body become key components of the hybrid utopian society, where individuals 
adhere to a posthuman consciousness that recognizes a plurality of perspective and self. 
The multiplicity of this consciousness both materially and historically situates the 
characters, allowing them to more readily navigate the uncertainties of a posthuman 
world, and indicating ways we can embrace this posthumanity even without sprouting 
spines or tails. 
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The arc of this work will thus provide an indication of the ways the human-animal 
hybrid figure exhibits utopian horror, or the use of horror or fear to instigate new, better, 
ways of conceptualizing human-animal and human-environmental relationships. This 
utopian horror of the hybrids can therefore be a very productive way of invoking 
recognition of interrelatedness and embeddedness: of our already posthuman plurality of 
self. These narratives force us to acknowledge the ways in which we have never been 
“human” as we understand the term, that humanity is merely a construction that atomizes 
us from the living, breathing earth, and thus to be fully alive, we must embrace our 
posthumanity. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
“WE CROSSED A LINE—THINGS GOT CONFUSED” 
MEETING THE MONSTER IN THE  
HORROR FILM SPLICE 
 
 
The horizon where the monsters dwell might well be imagined as 
the visible edge of the hermeneutic circle itself: the monstrous 
offers an escape from its hermetic path, an invitation to explore 
new spirals, new and interconnected methods of perceiving the 
world. In the face of the monster, scientific inquiry and its ordered 
rationality crumble. (Cohen 7) 
 
 
Vincenzo Natali’s 2009 sci-fi horror monster movie Splice serves as a particularly 
fruitful place for instigating discussion about human and animal interrelatedness and 
inherent interconnectivity through its careful use of horror and the tropes of the monster 
movie. Natali pulls no punches, and takes his audience above and beyond their comfort 
zones to exhibit the real consideration we must give both these relationships and the 
practice of science. Set in contemporary Canada, Splice stresses the immediacy of these 
issues by refusing the temporal leap to the future many science fiction narratives employ. 
The film toys with the lines between the monstrous and the human, leaving the audience 
uneasy and somewhat disturbed at its finale—unsure if there is any character worth truly 
rooting for. Is the film’s so-called monster truly monstrous? Are its human scientists 
humane? This uncertainty leaves the story open-ended, a fitting “conclusion” for 
concepts as unsettled as those it portrays.  
Splice follows the story of geneticists (and couple) Clive (played by Adrien 
Brody) and Elsa (Sarah Polley), who create animal hybrids to produce proteins for the 
research and development arm of a pharmaceutical company called N.E.R.D. (Nucleic 
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Exchange Research and Development). Wishing to take their research to the next level 
and believing in their ability to revolutionize science, Clive and Elsa request permission 
to incorporate human DNA into the mix. The ethical gamble, however, is too great for the 
company to risk—particularly as it is uncertain the project will produce lucrative results. 
After being denied the autonomy to incorporate human genes, Clive and Elsa continue 
their work in secret and eventually produce a human-animal hybrid they name Dren 
(Delphine Chenéac). Dren comes complete with amphibious lungs, retractable wings, a 
poisonous stinger-tipped tail, and, unbeknownst to Clive, human DNA from Elsa herself. 
And as Dren grows (at an accelerated rate), her monstrous boundary-crossing nature, 
which moves not only across species boundaries, but also between the roles of specimen, 
child, and lover, begins to reveal Elsa and Clive’s own monstrous natures, just as she 
reveals her own humanity. 
 
Instigating Discussion with Horror 
What's interesting is that you're [Vincenzo Natali] part of popular 
culture that gets these things to be talked about. 
--Ira Flatow in interview with Natali (“Man Meets Animal) 
 
The idea for the story, Natali says, initially came from the infamous “Vacanti 
mouse:”  
[I]t was a very special mouse, because it appeared to have a human ear 
growing out of its back. … While it wasn't strictly a genetic experiment, it 
really looked like one. It's just an incredibly shocking image, and I knew 
instantly that there was a movie in that mouse. (“Interview: Cube and 
Splice Director…”) 
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The “shocking” nature of the Vacanti mouse’s seeming blend of human and animal 
genetics was something Natali knew he could develop into a provocative and unsettling 
monster movie. Though certain this level of shocking fare would polarize his audience, 
Natali was unconcerned, saying, “the only reaction I don't want is an indifferent one. If 
that's the reaction, then I have failed” (“Man Meets Animal”). And the reactions were 
certainly strong. In response to a particularly long-winded critique of the film by 
commenter nateninetenNate in the comments on blogger Michael A. Charles’s post 
“Dren/Not Dren: The unsatisfying ending of Splice,” fellow commenter Sam observed 
that “[f]or a terrible sci-fi movie, splice sure seems to have upset you [nateninetenNate] 
quite a bit.” Sam’s casual comment indicates the exact response director Natali had 
intended—whether or not the film was “enjoyed,” it certainly instigated passionate 
conversations about its topics. 
It was Natali’s intention to push boundaries with this film, and to instigate these 
discussions as he says,  
I actually think that the best horror films do exactly that. That’s what the 
horror genre is really all about, is to try, in the sort of safe context of a 
horror story, a fantasy story, is taking the audience somewhere where 
they’re not comfortable. (“SPLICE Interview”) 
And the film certainly does that. Aside from the ethical complexities inherent in tinkering 
with human genetics, and even aside from their marriage with animal DNA, the film 
unflinchingly renders sexual encounters between the human scientists and their 
“experiment.” And it is these encounters, in fact, that garnered the most attention among 
avid horror film fans and other moviegoers. Some responses registered disgust, such as a 
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review done for The Washington Post that began with: “The yuck factor spins off the 
charts in ‘Splice,’ a thoroughly repulsive science fiction-horror flick…” (Hornaday), or a 
disturbed uncertainty, such as this snippet from a piece at screencrush.com: “Adrien 
Brody [film character, Clive] having sex with the Dren creature from 'Splice' is definitely 
awkward—she's kind of like his daughter and she's also pretty much an animal, which 
makes this scene some terrifying combo of bestiality and incest” (Hayes). This 
“terrifying” interspecies sex scene also appears to be the most commonly reposted (based 
on a quick Google search of “Splice movie scenes”) and small snippets of it have been 
commonly converted into GIFs. 
 The sex scene was also one of the primary reasons for Splice’s release as an 
independent film during the Sundance Film Festival in 2009. Despite nearly 5 years 
trying to jumpstart the project, it wasn’t until Natali gained the support of well-known 
(and successful) horror writer, director, and producer Guillermo del Torro that he 
attracted investors:  
It was just a very challenging film. Because of Dren, it was always going 
to be costly for an independent film, but it also had the sexual side, which 
made it quite controversial and potentially dangerous. And I think that 
Guillermo's seal of approval kind of legitimized it and made it, in the eyes 
of investors, something that could be commercial. (Natali, “Interview: 
Cube and Splice Director…”) 
Del Torro’s role as the film’s executive producer thus allowed Natali to go ahead with 
Splice the way he had originally imagined it—with the “disturbing” sexual encounter 
between Dren and Clive:  
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It was [a crucial scene] and it was always there, it was kind of the raison 
d’être of the movie precisely because it hasn’t been seen before, and I felt 
it tapped into the very essence of what the film is about—that we’re going 
to watch the scientists turns [sic] into monsters and we’re going to find 
humanity in our creature, and that scene typifies that. (“Exclusive 
Interview”) 
And it was, arguably, this blending of the frightening horror-imagery and the disturbing 
character drama that allowed Splice to capture the minds of the broader public. Splice is, 
as Natali joked, “Infecting America” (“Man Meets Animal”).  
 
A Monster of a Monster Movie 
[W]hat distinguishes “Splice” is that it is a creature film, but it’s 
spliced with a relationship story. (Natali, “Man Meets Animal”)  
 
As Natali indicates above, Splice is not just a film about splicing, but is itself a 
spliced creation, one that could be read as a monster to rival even Dren. This blending of 
genres, however, is not evident in trailers released for the film—it is portrayed as purely a 
horror/monster movie, so first-time viewers expecting a typical horror movie might have 
gotten more than they bargained for (“Splice Official Trailer”). The genre-based 
expectations would have prepared viewers for “escapist delight”:  
The monster awakens one to the pleasures of the body, to the simple and 
fleeting joys of being frightened, or frightening—to the experience of 
mortality and corporeality. We watch the monstrous spectacle of the 
horror film because we know that the cinema is a temporary place, that the 
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jolting sensuousness of the celluloid images will be followed by reentry 
into the world of comfort and light. … The audience knows how the genre 
works. (Cohen 17) 
This escapism is generally paired with themes of transcendence above the monsters 
depicted onscreen, with what Stacy Alaimo calls the “vertical semiotics” of monster 
movies. “Such plots,” Alaimo says, “although they entertain the fear that humans are part 
of the nature they destroy, ultimately reassure us ... [by] signaling that humans are free to 
float above the nature of the beast” (“Discomforting Creatures” 280). These vertical 
movements are generally typified by the killing of, or victory over, the monster and the 
quintessential escape via helicopter. Natali offers no such comforting distance. 
The genre-bending nature of Splice ensures that while viewers may be reassured 
by their ability to walk out of the movie theater and “into the light,” any hopes of 
transcendence are withheld. Natali’s resultant sci-fi-horror drama subverts the work of 
typical monster-movies by citing the monstrous in interpersonal relationships and thus 
enmeshing his characters and monster in intimate and complex relationships. As Natali 
asserts, Splice was “always about who these people are and their relationship to one 
another, and the thing they make, which is in itself more than just a creature. It is a 
character in the story…” (“Man Meets Animal”). This relocation of horror into the realm 
of relationships and family is indicative of shifts in recent postmodern ecohorror 
narratives. Instead of placing ecohorror in an external “nature” context, postmodern 
horror films “place the locus of horror squarely on humanity (particularly the family)” 
(Rust 551). And as Alaimo observes in her analysis of monstrous natures in recent horror, 
some films, such as “Habitat and Safe dramatize that the home, the sanctuary from 
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supposedly external threats, is itself a monstrous place. … [They] dramatize the 
impossibility of demarcating protected places and thus serve as potent counterpoints to 
prevalent kill-the-beast plots, vertical visions, and transcendent conclusions” 
(“Discomforting Creatures” 288-289). And Splice, is, undoubtedly just such a film. In an 
online review, reviewer Keith Phipps describes this unsettling nature of the genre-
bending film: 
Any resemblance to the actual experience of parenting is, of course, not at 
all coincidental. … Natali keeps the film unsettling by using icky creature 
effects, but just as often by offering up grotesque caricatures of real-life 
parenting discomforts, from the exhaustion to the collapse of privacy to 
the difficulty of instilling a moral code in an offspring that often seems 
alien. The film keeps a sometimes too-clinical distance but pushes buttons 
from afar, including a final act that turns into a series of outrages bound to 
upset audiences who might have stumbled in expecting the usual monster-
of-the-week horror movie instead of this thriving, disturbing, thoughtful 
mutant of a movie. (Phipps) 
This integration of the monster into the family unit, and within deeply intimate 
relationships, is also, I argue, essential for Splice’s success. By refusing the distancing 
transcendence of typical monster movies, the film also refuses an easy, and forgettable, 
conclusion. Audience members are unable to easily identify with any one character, as 
moral questionability is pervasive among the primary characters, and the finale (what 
Phipps called a “series of outrages”) is really a series of culturally contested and taboo 
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sex-based behavior: incest, transexuality4, rape, and what could be deemed bestiality. At 
the climax of the film Dren changes sex and impregnates Elsa with a second-generation 
hybrid baby. While the finale does also include Dren’s death (and thus the death of the 
most visually monstrous character) the pregnancy is representative of the inescapable 
closeness of the characters—a relationship that could not be more intimate. While we will 
return to this unsettling conclusion later in this chapter, for now it is key to note that this 
move not only refuses transcendent distance, it collapses all distance by embodying the 
monstrous hybrid within a primary character. This embodiment is a particularly 
compelling finale because it collapses some of the primary dualisms set up throughout 
the film, dualisms that we will map in the next section through an analysis of the film’s 
aesthetic design.  
 
Category Crisis in Color 
The too-precise laws of nature as set forth by science are gleefully 
violated in the freakish compilation of the monster’s body. A 
mixed category, the monster resists any classification built on 
hierarchy or a merely binary opposition… (Cohen 6-7) 
 
Throughout the film, Natali sets up a series of parallel dualities that map onto 
locations—specifically on the laboratory where Clive and Elsa work, and the rural 
farmhouse where they retreat to raise Dren. This spaces fit easily into the quintessential 
Cartesian dualisms of mind and body, objectivity and subjectivity, and, one could argue, 
control and chaos. The messy space of the home is rife with emotional head-butting 
among the characters, and the clean and controlled laboratory exhibits (or, attempts to 
                                                
4 While I am hesitant to place Dren’s sex change within a categorization of the “taboo,” this change is certainly intended to 
(problematically) unsettle and frighten the audience. 
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exhibit) reason and clear-headedness. These dualisms are further mapped onto the 
characters as each navigates their own dual identities. Clive and Elsa must come to terms 
with their contrasting roles as scientists and parents and, correspondingly, Dren walks a 
similar line between child and specimen. It is key to note here as well, that Clive and 
Elsa’s attempts to separate their two identities are already threatened by the very fact that 
they are a couple working together on the same research project. Even Clive’s brother 
works under them in the lab, so the realm of the family and the domestic have already 
been layered onto the workplace even before Dren enters the picture, though it is her 
existence that demands this blurring be recognized and grappled with.  
But despite the already present blending of domains and identities, Elsa and Clive 
still struggle to navigate the seemingly irreconcilable differences between scientific 
research and parenting, and achieve little real success. Elsa, at first enthralled by the pride 
of producing such an intelligent and remarkable child, is eventually undone by her 
inability to control Dren’s adolescent rebellions and resorts to violent means to regain the 
upper hand. And Clive, initially against bringing Dren to term, is soon seduced by her 
humanity and goes from strictly approaching her as a “specimen” to both befriending 
and, eventually, sexually desiring her. To represent these struggles and to deconstruct the 
boundaries between these spaces and identities, Natali sets up clearly identifiable color 
palettes that are associated with each space—the laboratory is represented through shades 
of blue and the home through golds and browns. In this section we will look at the ways 
Natali first sets up these contrasting spaces and then uses their identifiability to 
strategically mingle the colors onscreen and thus deconstruct their polarity. 
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From the outset of the film, the scientific work place of the laboratory is defined 
through the color blue. The décor and props in these sets are dominated by machinery 
accented in blues, boxes and notebooks with blue covers, and metallic stainless steel 
surfaces that reflect back the blue lighting. The cast is also often dressed in blue scrubs, 
masks, and gloves. The iciness of color accentuates the already crisp blue-white of the 
fluorescent lighting used in laboratories, an effect that is intensified through post-
production color saturation. In some scenes, particularly those from the beginning of the 
film, this color saturation allows few other colors to remain (see fig. 1).  
Fig. 1. Clive and Elsa in the laboratory recording one of their experiments. 
The use of blue to characterize such a technology-rich setting is fitting, as most digital 
screens give off a blue glow, particularly familiar in the context of computer screens. The 
cool quality of the color also reflects the conception of science as a “cool and 
calculating” profession, where objectivity and logic-based thinking are celebrated. And, 
interestingly, this blue saturation becomes less intense as the movie progresses, with 
laboratory scenes in the latter half of the film exhibiting a milder blue palette, hinting at a 
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degradation of scientific credibility and objectivity (see fig. 2). The lessening of the blue 
saturation also allows for a more realistic color spectrum, making figures easier to 
perceive, and perhaps offering a more truthful portrayal of the characters and 
circumstances. 
 
Fig. 2. Elsa at the laboratory in the latter half of the film. 
This cold blue palette is contrasted with the warm golds and browns that 
characterize the rural domestic scenes of the farm where Clive and Elsa live with Dren 
(see fig. 3). The farmhouse and barn sets are dominated by wood paneling and the warm 
lighting reminiscent of incandescent bulbs often used in homes. Décor, costumes, and 
props also follow this general scheme. The deep browns and golds offer a rich and 
nurturing setting—reminiscent of the natural world, and encoded with its redemptive 
“Mother Nature” tropes. The warm colors indicate the comfort and care one expects to 
find in a domestic setting, which emphasizes the importance of relationships and emotive 
thinking and expression. The barn sets are also often lit with natural light—sunny rays 
beaming in through skylights and slats in the wooden walls. In addition, the natural 
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lighting featured in these scenes is often supplemented by high fill lighting, more fully 
illuminating the actors, and perhaps indicating that the domestic space reveals their “true 
natures.” 
 
Fig. 3. Elsa and Dren in the barn where Dren lives. 
These color schemes produce a clear map to code-switching between the two 
locations—they differ so completely it would be nearly impossible to mistake one space 
for another. The additional association between space and particular traits and identities 
as outlined above also allows the traits themselves to become color-coded, so in moments 
when the characters struggle to navigate contrasting traits and identities, the two color 
schemes begin to appear simultaneously on screen. And these moments of struggle are 
often expressed through the mapping of these colors onto the physical bodies of the 
characters themselves—thus further mingling and embodying the seemingly 
irreconcilable polarities. Next we will look at two of these key moments, and while both 
of these “struggles” occur in the domestic space, I think it is more important to note that 
they both occur in the space that Dren inhabits. Dren is, after all, the physical 
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embodiment of the breach between the workplace and home-life—between the 
experiment and the family—and it is ultimately her presence that has triggered Elsa and 
Clive’s “identity crises.”  
For Elsa, her primary struggle is depicted through her desire for control. She 
seems to feel most comfortable in the laboratory where she is surrounded by the beeps 
and clicks of mechanized regularity and predictability. As Clive bitterly states later in the 
film, “You never wanted a normal child because you were afraid of losing control. But an 
experiment, that’s something else.” Her primary struggles thus do not occur until they are 
forced to move Dren from the laboratory (where they are being too closely watched to 
hide her any longer) to the old farm Elsa inherited from her mother and where she grew 
up. Even in this rural space, they try to keep Dren contained by locking her away in the 
barn5, which they have overhauled into a livable space, with couches, a makeshift 
kitchen, and even a swimming tank. Within this space, Elsa tries to maintain the exacting 
control over Dren that she held while in the laboratory. She continues to feed Dren a 
vegetarian diet (despite Dren’s early escape, where she catches and eats a rabbit, 
revealing her omnivorous needs), confines her indoors, and even takes away a cat that 
Dren befriends, certain it might have a disease. Elsa’s fear of losing control is linked 
further with the farmhouse space when the truth of her childhood abuse at the hands of 
her mother is revealed. Her actions while at the farm can be seen as, in part, a response to 
this childhood abuse, disturbingly acted out upon Dren in similar ways.  
Restricting what Dren plays with is one of the primary tools that Elsa employs to 
maintain control. Though Elsa at first takes Dren’s cat friend away from her, she gives it 
                                                
5 The placement of Dren in the barn interestingly others her beyond her roles as child and specimen, and places her in the realm of the 
domestic animal. 
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back as a “reward” for good behavior—an attempt to further exert control over Dren 
through this system of reward and punishment. Dren, however, is clearly able to play 
similar games, and retaliates by killing the cat with her stinger-tipped tail. But, it isn’t 
until Elsa physically slaps Dren to punish her that Dren uses her full strength to 
overpower Elsa, steals the barn-key and attempts to flee. Elsa quickly recovers, however, 
and (horrifically), as Dren looks outside in wonder, knocks her out with a shovel. But this 
violent action was not enough for Elsa, and thus when Dren awakens, she is strapped to a 
table in the center of the barn. Elsa circles her, recording verbal observations of the 
“specimen” in her handheld recorder:  
Physically, H-50 has evolved well. However, recent violent behavior 
suggests dangerous psychological developments. Erratic behavior may be 
caused by a disproportionate species identification. Cosmetically human 
affectation should be eliminated wherever possible. 
Once done speaking, Elsa uses surgical scissors to cut away Dren’s dress, removes her 
necklace, and wipes away her makeup. Elsa’s response, then, to her inability to control 
Dren, is to revert back to her scientist self, and to deny Dren the autonomy and 
personhood that she had before (now calling her by her specimen identification number, 
“H-50”). The camera angles reflect this power shift, as Elsa is viewed from low angles 
and Dutch-angled shots from Dren’s perspective. A couple of extreme high-angle shots 
look down at Dren in her vulnerable state, strapped to the table in an almost crucifix-like 
shape, her arms stretched out from her sides, and her legs strapped together (see fig. 4). 
This vulnerability and Christ-like portrayal of Dren also reinforces our identification with 
her plight, and horror at Elsa’s behavior. 
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Fig. 4. Dren, strapped to the table, spotlighted, and depicted in a cross-shape. 
This power shift and Elsa’s reversion to her scientist-self is also visually represented by 
her donning of blue surgical gloves and a mask (see fig. 5). By covering her hands and 
lips with the blue of the laboratory, she indicates that the intimate touch and kiss of a 
mother have been overruled, and she will maintain her objective distance. The mask also 
reduces her face down to the anonymity of merely a pair of eyes, underscoring the 
scientific rigor of objectivity, and her need to demarcate between the objective scientist 
working a controlled experiment, and the subjective mother raising an unpredictable 
child. Of course, though the mask implies objectivity, the expression in Elsa’s eyes is 
unmistakably that of revenge. 
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Fig. 5. A Dutch-angle point-of-view shot as Elsa prepares to numb Dren’s tail. 
When done removing Dren’s clothing, she makes her final observation: “Due to her 
unstable condition, it has become necessary to remove her zootoxin glands and stinger.” 
Elsa’s final act with Dren strapped to the table is thus to numb and remove Dren’s poison 
glands and stinger from her tail, further attempting to exert control over her; a scene the 
horrified Clive walks in on.   
Walking in on this scene both horrifies and challenges Clive. He is unable to 
adequately respond to Elsa’s drastic shift from the loving mother to the heartless scientist, 
as it brings to light both his own struggles to navigate that duality and the real 
consequences that can result from these intersections. Consequently, not long after this 
scene, Elsa has returned to the lab (her place of comfort and refuge) and Clive has 
retreated into the farmhouse, poured himself a drink, and is sitting down to monitor Dren 
via their security camera system. Clive and his set are color schemed in browns and 
warmer colors, and the surveillance footage, though seemingly “black and white” has a 
distinctly blue tint (see fig. 6).  
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Fig. 6. One of the security camera views of Dren’s barn. 
As Clive stares at the computer, the close-up frames his face with a blue glow from the 
window over one shoulder. This adds a blue cast to the shadows across his face, which is 
contrasted with the warm golden glow from the lamps across his left cheek (see fig. 7). 
The colors identifying Clive’s dual identities are thus mapped directly onto the skin of his 
face, underscoring the ways the two are beginning to bleed over onto one another. The 
placement of the domestic tones on the lit side of his face also indicates the dominance of 
his subjective self in this moment and the suppression of the objectivity he should be 
exhibiting while monitoring his “experiment.” 
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Fig. 7. As he looks at the computer, Clive’s face is partially illuminated in gold, with the  
shadows on his face gaining a blue tint from the window behind him. 
As he clicks through the different cameras, he leans forward intently towards the 
computer screen. The shots flip between close-ups of Clive’s face and increasingly close 
close-ups of the computer screen, indicating the building intensity and desire to find 
Dren. When Clive finally finds her swimming in her water tank, she appears ethereal, like 
a mermaid or siren as she moves slowly about in the half-light of the image. The effect of 
the underwater security camera gives the image a distinctive green tint, interesting in that 
these colors are the direct blending of the blue and gold color palettes that identify the 
two locations and identities that Dren herself blends. She seems to know Clive is 
watching, and faces the camera—her gaze seeming to go straight through its lens to 
where Clive sits. The alternating shot style used here is reminiscent of those for capturing 
conversations between two characters—giving the further sense that Clive is not the only 
one watching.  
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And the blending of the domestic and the technologically embedded scientific are 
further blended here as Clive attempts to reach out to Dren. Though he is looking at her 
through the blue light of the surveillance cameras, he reaches out to touch her screen-
form, which temporarily illuminates his fingertips with blue—further blending and 
coding the colors of the two spaces onto his skin (see fig. 8).  
 
Fig. 8. Clive touches the computer screen, illuminating his fingers in blue. 
And Dren seems to intuitively recognize his gesture and gaze, as she reaches out as well, 
and for a moment it seems as though she will be able to touch him through the screen (see 
fig. 9). This movement highlights Dren’s inherent power and agency that allows her to 
blend and navigate her multi-faceted nature (power that Elsa had tried, and failed, to 
control).  
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Fig. 9. Dren reaches out to Clive through the screen. Note the distinct green tint to her  
image. 
Dren’s agency here can be identified through Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s conception 
of the monstrous body: 
The monster’s body quite literally incorporates fear, desire, anxiety, and 
fantasy (ataractic or incendiary), giving them life and an uncanny 
independence. … This corporeal fluidity, this simultaneity of anxiety and 
desire, ensures that the monster will always dangerously entice. (Cohen 4, 
19) 
Dren may have been set back by Elsa’s controlling actions, but she can never really be 
controlled—it is part of her allure and the threat she poses. Here, even under the 
surveillance conditions of the experiment, she can physically and emotionally reach out 
to Clive. And it is the corporeal agency and fluidity exhibited in this boundary-crossing 
movement that frightens him (and also, likely, his conflicting desire for her and his fear 
of that desire) and he attempts to close it off by physically shutting the laptop. In contrast, 
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then, to Elsa’s assertive smothering of her maternal instincts with a mask of scientific 
clarity and categories, Clive instead retreats altogether. When his desire for Dren 
becomes so powerful it manages to reach through the bounds of the experiment, the 
computer, and across space, his only ability to resist becomes the removal of temptation 
altogether by closing Dren’s image away inside the computer. And, of course, when he 
meets her in person next he is completely unable to resist her physical allure—and when 
Elsa inadvertently witnesses the resulting sexual encounter they are forced to finally stop 
and reconsider their actions. 
At this point in the film, Dren can be seen as not only a blending of the human 
and animal, and the child and specimen, but also as a combination of power and 
vulnerability. Her physical, sexual, intellectual, and other powers are continually (though 
barely) held in check through Elsa’s, and sometimes Clive’s, actions because of the threat 
this power poses. And it seems their only ability to control her relies on her “othered” 
identities as a child, female, animal, and specimen—all figures whose derogatory and 
oppressive treatment has been historically justified through their designations as 
“subhuman.” The more power and agency Dren exhibits (the more she attempts to rise 
above her “otherness”), the more potent and violent the response is from Clive and Elsa. 
And her horrendous treatment at the hands of her makers serves to represent not only her 
own suffering, but also the suffering of all oppressed peoples6. Her hybrid body is thus a 
locus for identifying the power of hybridity and of the “other.” This is the power that can 
be found in the dissolution of all boundaries and the acceptance of a place within an 
active and agential material world where all lives (and all matter) are valued.  
                                                
6 Here I use “peoples” to refer to not only humans, but also other animals. 
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Dren’s disregard for and dissolution of boundaries makes her a key figure of the 
monstrous “Harbinger of Category Crisis:”  
The too-precise laws of nature as set forth by science are gleefully violated 
in the freakish compilation of the monster’s body. A mixed category, the 
monster resists any classification built on hierarchy or a merely binary 
opposition, demanding instead a “system” allowing polyphony, mixed 
response (difference in sameness, repulsion in attraction), and resistance to 
integration—allowing what Hogle has called with a wonderful pun “a 
deeper play of differences, a nonbinary polymorphism at the ‘base’ of 
human nature.” (6-7) 
Dren is a material embodiment of this polyphony. She exposes suppressed sexuality and 
animality, and her ability to integrate so many classifications gives her powerful agency, 
and makes her an object of both intense fear and uncontrollable desire. In Kelly Oliver’s 
book on Hollywood filmic pregnancies, she emphasizes that “Dren is the return of 
repressed otherness within, an animal monstrousness that also wants love and affection” 
(145).  
Dren’s fluidity of identity and self (including her sexuality), thus are horrifying 
just as they are desirable. Though, to underscore Kelly Oliver’s observation, I’d contend 
that much of the fear that accompanies her figure is fear of the rise of the oppressed—the 
rise of our own “repressed otherness within.” This is the fear that by allowing the 
oppressed equal footing we might unleash their as yet suppressed wrath—a theme evident 
in much ecohorror as the “revenge of nature” trope (Tidwell 538). But these figurations 
are misguided because they indicate an insurmountable separateness of self and other 
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(humans and nature), rather than acknowledging the interconnectivity that has always 
already been present—the otherness that is already within. Dren is a clear embodiment of 
the posthuman figure who moves beyond ecological existentialist fears and into the place 
of connectivity and uncertainty for which Deborah Bird Rose advocates. Her presence 
thus triggers acknowledgements of these already present uncertainties and 
interconnectivities that the frightened humans are unwilling to accept—resulting in their 
panicked and monstrous behavior. 
 
Who is the Monster?  
(Or, Which Monster Should I Fear?) 
 
Clive: We crossed a line—things got confused. 
 
And as noted earlier, Natali fully intended his audience to “find humanity” in 
Dren, while watching Clive and Elsa turn “into monsters” (“Exclusive Interview”). 
Ultimately, then, we are intended to see Clive and Elsa as the most monstrous figures in 
the film. And it is this shift in the monster-human dynamic that forces an introspective 
and uncomfortable look at not only the ethical practice of science, but also the, quite 
literally, closer to home issue of dysfunctional and damaging parenting. A discomfort that 
reinforces our sympathy for and identification with Dren, whose dual identity as both 
child and specimen places her completely at the mercy of Clive and Elsa, whether in the 
context of the home or the laboratory. And built into this association with the monster as 
innocent and the human as monstrous is a recurring theme identifying humans as the 
bearers of negative and dangerous traits, rather than animals. This correlation seems to 
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beg the question: Is it Dren’s animality or humanity that makes her frightening? And the 
answer seems to most consistently point towards the latter. 
Early in the film, as Clive and Elsa discuss whether Dren’s stinger is a defensive 
or predatory trait, Elsa observes: “None of her animal elements had predatory 
characteristics;” to which Clive replies, “Well, there’s always the human element.” This 
frames Dren’s negative behaviors early on as the fault of human genetics, rather than the 
DNA that would traditionally constitute her as “other.” And in the scene discussed above, 
when Elsa deems Dren’s “erratic behavior” as caused by “disproportionate species 
identification,” that problem is immediately considered a matter of identification as 
human, and thus she continues, “Cosmetically human affectation should be eliminated 
wherever possible.” Here Elsa marks not Dren’s hybridity per se as the problem, but 
rather her “disproportionate species identification” as human—an association Elsa had 
originally encouraged. This scene reinforces the perception of human genetics as 
negative, particularly as we witness the horrors the scene’s only “pure” human inflicts 
upon the part-human from the latter’s perspective. Many shots in that scene are from 
Dren’s point of view (generally Dutch-angled to reinforce this identification), so we must 
watch, just as helplessly as Dren, while Elsa cuts away her (our) clothing and tail. As 
Splice co-writer Doug Taylor notes, “[it’s] character disturbing, [and] I think that’s what 
really got me [interested in the project]. It wasn’t a monster movie about monsters 
chasing people; it was about people behaving atrociously to their monster” (A Director’s 
Playground). And these atrocities are all brought to the fore and examined in a later scene 
that toys with the line between the humane and the monstrous, underscoring the film’s 
equation of the human (and human traits) with the negative.  
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After witnessing Clive and Dren having sex, Elsa flees the scene with Clive 
hurriedly following. They return to their apartment in the city—a location they have not 
returned to since their removal to the farm. The set here can be seen as a neutralization of 
the color palettes connected with the farmhouse and the laboratory. The décor and props 
are mostly cream and in shades of pale blue and green, and the light is warm enough to 
indicate a domestic environment, though still lacks the deep golden hues of the farm sets 
(see fig. 10). 
Fig 10. Elsa and Clive’s apartment. 
And most notably, though Clive is pacing around the room and Elsa is sitting at the table, 
all camera angles throughout their conversation are at eye level. This makes the 
interaction seem to be more equal, neutral, and diminishes the ability for either character 
to hold higher moral ground for long. This neutrality also seems fitting as both characters 
seem to be confronting their behavior and acknowledging their mistakes: 
Clive: We fucked up. Jesus Christ. We’ve chained her up. We locked her 
away from the world. We maimed her.  
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Elsa (crying): I maimed her. 
The key turning point of the scene, however, is when Clive sadly laments: “I just wish 
things could go back to the way they were.” At these words, Elsa wipes away her tears 
and informs him that she was able to synthesize a protein from Dren’s stinger that they 
had been searching for (and failing to find) from their previous animal-hybrid specimens. 
This shift indicates her readiness to let things “go back to the way they were” and to try 
and forget what they did to Dren. At this, Clive comes to sit down at the table with Elsa, 
showing that Dren’s fate is now “back on the table:” 
Clive: We could maybe save things. I don’t mean us. I mean… 
Elsa: Oh God, we can’t do that. I can’t. We have a responsibility. 
Clive: Experiment’s over. Our responsibility is to end it. 
Clive’s haunting end to this conversation, and scene, leaves the audience very 
unsure what they have decided. Are they planning on killing Dren? This decision is made 
even more disturbing by the “levelness” of the camera angles and thus the normalcy with 
which they plan Dren’s death around the sitting room table in their funky, bourgeois 
apartment. And the removal from both the farmhouse and laboratory spaces was an 
essential move for this discussion to provide such an uncanny and creepy feeling. Since 
the two other spaces are already encoded with so many traits and tainted by prior actions, 
the apartment offers a visual and moral clean slate from which Clive and Elsa can 
“neutrally” assess the situation. And, specifically, they must leave the space that Dren 
inhabits and go to a space she has, in fact, never physically been, in order to reestablish 
their world order and clean demarcations between “right and wrong.” As Cohen notes, 
“the monstrous offers an escape from its hermetic path, an invitation to explore new 
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spirals, new and interconnected methods of perceiving the world” (7). Dren’s 
embodiment of new possibility has thus flown in the face of what Elsa and Clive once 
conceived of as “right and wrong” and their only way to regain those distinctions is to, in 
turn, flee before the uncertainty she represents. In Clive’s words, they had “changed the 
rules” and now must reestablish them. Of course, despite the disturbing solution they 
come to (to “end the experiment”), when they return to the farm they find Dren dying—
or so they think. Though she is in fact in the early stages of metamorphoses as her body 
changes sex, Clive and Elsa mourn Dren’s death as if they had never planned it 
themselves. This move, unfortunately, diminishes the potency of the apartment scene, as 
viewers are invited to, along with Clive and Elsa, forget it ever happened—thus lessening 
the viewer’s identification with Dren through their mourning and reestablishing alliance 
with Clive and Elsa.  
But, despite Dren’s dramatic return in male form, killing Clive and raping Elsa, 
and her death at Elsa’s own hands, the film still does not conclude with a victory over the 
monstrous and an affirmation of the human. When we cut from Elsa’s sobbing form, and 
Clive and Dren’s dead ones, Natali cleverly fades the dark scene into brilliant white-gold 
light, perhaps tempting us with the prospect of transcendence, but the scene we are led 
into inescapably re-entrenches the viewer in ethically dubious behavior. Joan Chorot, the 
CEO of the pharmaceutical company Elsa works for steps into the frame, saying, “Your 
Dren turned out to be a cauldron of unimaginable chemical mysteries.” Even before we 
see Elsa, or the rest of the sky-rise office where the scene is set, Dren has been 
decontextualized, dehumanized, and reestablished as a specimen. The camera then cuts to 
a long shot of Elsa sitting at a desk, with Joan pacing along the windows (see fig. 11). 
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Fig. 11. The CEO’s office. 
In the shot, Elsa is isolated in the center, seated, as Joan walks around her. The framing 
of the shot is claustrophobic (impressively, for the size and expansiveness of the space) 
and the lines of the room seem to indicate that Elsa has nowhere to go but forward, and 
no options or choices she can make otherwise. Even Elsa’s attitude, looking forward and 
not at Joan, reinforces this isolation and limitation. The room, though fairly neutral in 
color, does, however, fit within the color palette of the laboratory through the cool and 
steely tones of the light and carpet, particularly as these tones are in spite of the huge 
picture windows that should allow in warmer light. This contextualization of the space in 
the hues of the scientific thus reinforces the designation of Dren as a mere “specimen,” 
and frames the interaction as one of business-like objectivity. It is Elsa’s blue maternity 
dress, however, that most fully underscores the impossibility of this objectivity. This 
direct blending of the scientific and motherhood in turn sets up Joan’s offering of a 
“generous” sum of money to Elsa in return for her carrying her hybrid baby to term in the 
interest of further research. It is clear through her smiling comment that because of Dren 
 43 
they will be “filing patents for years,” that no matter what the ethical and moral 
considerations, the company will do whatever it takes to profit—making scientific 
objectivity even more impossible. 
 The move, then, to reject a transcendent conclusion by embodying the monstrous 
hybrid within Elsa is reinforced through the inescapably moral concerns that are being 
overlooked in the business transaction. This need for consideration is underscored when 
Joan gives Elsa the room to opt out by saying “no one would blame [her]” if she decided 
not to do it, to which Elsa replies, “What’s the worst that can happen?” After these words 
the scene fades away to the faint sound of ambulance sirens echoing from the street 
below. Elsa’s flippant comment is thus, of course, meant to be ironical, as clearly the 
consequences of not carefully considering her actions have the potential to be particularly 
horrible. Such a conclusion disallows not only a triumph over the monstrous hybrid, but 
also a simplification and belittlement of the consideration the hybrid figure demands—
and thus it also disallows an easy break from the escapism of the theater. Dren is a 
monster whose questions will follow you out the door and into the light of day: “These 
monsters ask us how we perceive the world, how we have misrepresented what we have 
attempted to place. They ask us to reevaluate our cultural assumptions about race, gender, 
sexuality, our perception of difference, our tolerance toward its expression. They ask us 
why we have created them” (Cohen 20).  
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We’ve met the Monster and She is Us 
 
I think the general audience is really interested in seeing these 
kinds of stories because they’re really about where we’re headed. 
And, in some way, a reflection of who we are at this particular 
time, at this juncture. (Vincenzo Natali, “SPLICE Interview”) 
 
Dren’s refusal to stay locked behind the theater doors makes her a quintessential 
monster. As outlined in the introductory chapter to this thesis, the monster’s body is a 
cultural one. Born at the crossroads of change, the monster is a concretization of the 
cultural fears of that historical point, thus the fears we find encoded on Dren’s body are 
not just cinematic fears, but cultural ones. Her hybrid body exposes the interrelatedness 
between humans and other animals—she refuses attempts to distance the human from the 
animal other and demands a reintegration into a trans-corporeal and agential world. She 
asks us to give up our semblance of control and certainty, and to accept the inherent 
connectivity and uncertainty of life. She frightens and compels because these concepts 
do. To accept connectivity and uncertainty is to accept the need to reimagine our 
relationships with other animals, and even with ourselves—no easy feat. And these are 
demands being made by not just the fictitious monsters, but also those coming into being 
in laboratories across the world. As one journalist observed in regards to these chimeras, 
“[t]he real question isn't how we stop them from being created, it's what do we do once 
they get here. Because one way or another, the monsters are coming” (Saenz).  
As Splice’s success attests, the horror film can play a key role in instigating these 
discussions precisely because of its basis in cultural fears. Horror-theorist Noël Carroll 
writes: 
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Since the horror genre is, in a manner of speaking, founded upon the 
disturbance of cultural norms, both conceptual and moral, it provides a 
repertory of symbolism for those times in which the cultural order—albeit 
at a lower level of generality—has collapsed or is perceived to be in a state 
of dissolution. Thus, horror, a genre which may typically only command a 
limited following … can command mass attention when its iconography 
and structures are deployed in such a way that they articulate the 
widespread anxiety of times of stress. (Carroll 214) 
Thus, to borrow Natali’s words, this film is about who we are at this juncture in time. The 
massive outburst of rage, confusion, and discomfort in response to the film indicates that 
these fears could not be more relevant. We are coming to grips with the fact that the 
hierarchical and atomistic structures with which the Western tradition has historically 
dealt with nature are not only inadequate, but also factually incorrect. And it was these 
structures that initially produced our conception of the human species’ uniqueness, so to 
acknowledge their faultiness is to acknowledge interrelatedness, interconnectedness, and 
integration among the wider community of life—with our, as Val Plumwood tenderly 
calls them, “earth others.” The shock, horror, and fear initially incited by the chimera 
figure can thus be used to garner attention for and consideration of these difficult 
concepts. In the next chapter we will explore the ways in which this move from isolation 
to connectivity, certainty to uncertainty, and horror to utopia are explored through the 
posthuman hybrid bodies of the “ferals” in Kat Falls’ YA novel Inhuman. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
FERAL OR FREE? 
UNCAGING THE POSTHUMAN IN THE  
YA NOVEL INHUMAN 
 
 
Never let them tame you. 
—Inhuman tagline 
  
  
In the post-apocalyptic world of Kat Falls’s YA novel Inhuman (2013), the 
humans must cope with the horror of categorically complex hybrids and the threat of a 
virus that blends one’s own genetic code with that of the animal-other. Through rewriting 
categories, the humans attempt to reconstruct the boundaries between the human and 
other, an attempt that ultimately fails due to the virus’s disregard for physical boundaries. 
Here we will look at these linguistic adaptive measures, the ways they fail to live up to 
material threats, and how acknowledgement of vulnerability ultimately frames their lives. 
I argue that the construction of the “feral” human-animal hybrid in this novel serves as a 
visual representation of our already trans-corporeal posthuman existence. The novel’s 
protagonist, sixteen-year-old Lane, concludes her journey by recognizing this reality, and 
moving to embrace her wilder impulses and a broader conception of the “human” self. 
Lane has grown up in the aftermath of an epidemic that decimated the eastern 
United States, killing 40 percent of the nation’s population. The Ferae Naturae virus (“of 
a wild nature”) was produced and accidently released by Titan, a chain of maze-themed 
parks, who, in reparation, built a quarantine wall on the western shore of the Mississippi 
River to keep all those infected in the eastern states, now called the “Feral Zone.” 
Intended for producing minotaurs and other hybrids to add to their mazes, Ferae Naturae 
is a “bootloader” virus that carries inside it a particular animal species’ DNA—50 strains 
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of which were produced, each carrying the genetic information of a different species. 
When the virus was first released, victims were rendered zombie-like and, after attacking 
others and spreading the disease, died soon after infection. 19 years later, the DNA are 
now incorporated into the victim’s genetic makeup through viral transduction. This 
genetic corruption (or what they call “grupping”) is subsequently expressed through the 
appearance of phenotypic traits of the viral DNA. 
 Lane’s life on the “safe” side of the wall—where germaphobia is the norm and 
high school is conducted over the Internet—is interrupted when she is pulled from a rare 
in-person party with friends to learn her art dealer father has been working as a “fetch,” 
illegally crossing the quarantine wall to collect paintings left behind, and is now under 
threat of execution for his crimes. Barely able to escape back into the Feral Zone, Lane’s 
father Mack still has a death sentence hanging over him unless Lane can find him in time 
for one last fetch. Director Taryn Spurling, the Head of Biohazard Defense, has offered 
Lane the chance to clear Mack’s name if he will fetch a photo of her daughter from her 
home in Chicago—and be back in five days. After over a day searching and, unable to 
find her father, Lane sets out on the journey to Chicago herself, with the help of line 
guard Everson and a path hacker from the Feral Zone, Rafe.  
 
New Stories for a New Reality 
When had I taken a hard left out of reality and into a bedtime 
story? (Falls 108) 
 
 From the start, Lane’s journey not only requires courage and cunning, but also the 
mastery of a completely new language and set of stories. Almost immediately after 
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crossing the wall, Lane comes to realize that the seemingly harmless fairytale stories her 
father used to tell her before bed were actually thinly veiled instructions about entering 
the Feral Zone. Every story began at the “skeleton tree, black as night” which marked the 
path down to the river (guarded by the “killer robots” [41]), and the careful avoidance of 
the explosive “harpy eggs” (39). The burnt out husk of a tree she encountered at the head 
of the trail was just as she’d always imagined it, and the scattered land mines across the 
landscape were an only too real risk. The first indication that Lane would be relying on 
stories to navigate this new hostile territory was Director Spurling’s final remark to her:  
“One last thing,’ she said. ‘I’m sure you’ve heard that the Ferae virus isn’t 
as lethal as it was nineteen years ago …. Then you’ve probably also heard 
that instead of dying, when people get infected now, they mutate.” 
A cold feeling crept along my neck. “Those are just stories.” 
“No, actually, they’re not. So be careful.” (32) 
Everything Lane once believed to be “just stories,” from the incredibly rude “wild boy” 
(soon revealed to be her new guide, Rafe) to the monstrous and mutated chimpacabras, 
are revealed to be accurate representations of the mysterious Feral Zone. These “stories” 
become necessary for Lane’s survival, making her idly wonder if her father had really 
been training her as a fetch all along. 
 And these stories are not the only new framework Lane comes to rely on—she 
also must learn a whole new vocabulary. The categorical clarity of language is threatened 
with the boundary-blurring that occurs in the bodies of the infected. Who is “human” and 
who is “animal” become contested categories, and are rendered nearly irrelevant in this 
new world. In Rafe’s words: “’Your line guard might call everyone who has Ferae a 
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feral, but over here, we have distinctions. Our lives depend on it’” (144). The primary 
distinction being between the “manimals,” those in the early stages of Ferae who are 
physically hybridized, but their human minds remain dominant, and “ferals,” those in the 
last stage of Ferae whose animal side is completely dominant: “’Ferals are feral. They’ve 
got animal brain’” (145), but there are also the “mongrels,” animal-animal hybrids that 
are often, at this stage, “tenth-generation hybrid” and no longer infectious (122). At one 
point, when Rafe idly mentions his job as a “hacker” (“path hacker,” essentially a hired 
guard that guides travellers between the new city-like compounds), Lane, exasperated, 
remarks “English, please,” indicating these new words are not so much a new vocabulary, 
but rather a new language, where the failure to learn has material consequences (149).  
 Ultimately, however, language fails to provide a fully stable foundation for 
Lane’s experience in the Feral Zone. Even the new, more specific, categories are unable 
to account for variations among manimals, and early on Lane finds herself seduced and 
deceived by a homicidal tiger-man named Chorda. Still new to the dangers of the Feral 
Zone and horrified by Rafe’s violent attacks upon the helpless tiger-man, Lane frees 
Chorda from Rafe’s trap. That region of the Zone had been recently plagued by attacks 
which left victims with their hearts torn out—and missing. Rafe had set traps in the hope 
of capturing the feral before more damage was done, but neither of them could be sure if 
Chorda was the one responsible. Without thinking, Lane inadvertently knocks out Rafe, 
and frees the tiger-man, who, once freed from the trap, is at first astounded by Lane and 
just watches her: 
Whatever the tiger-man was planning, I couldn’t tear my eyes from him. He was a 
fairy-tale creature come to life. Rings glinted on his fingers and diamonds 
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sparkled in his ears. He was heavily muscled, with pale orange skin and luxuriant 
fur covering his chest and arms. The pictures I had seen in Dr. Solis’s office had 
made it seem like the Ferae virus deformed its victims, but this man’s appearance 
was more alluring than horrifying. (107) 
And Chorda is just as allured by Lane due to her uncommon kindness, and he remarks, 
certain, that she is not from the Feral Zone. “’No one here is so…human’” he says, to 
which Lane replies, confused, “’You mean humane?’” (ellipsis and emphasis original 
108). Though Chorda agrees with her, Lane’s assurance of clear boundaries between the 
“pure” human and the hybrid are misguided and will be tested the farther into the Feral 
Zone she goes. As Rafe remarks later, “’The Feral Zone has a way of bringing out the 
animal in people’” (131). The potentiality for animal-like behavior is thus not purely a 
characteristic of the infected, but rather part of the intrinsic nature of the human that can 
be circumstantially drawn to the fore of a person’s consciousness. This is a key point I 
will return to later.  
 Lane’s preliminary assurance that Chorda is a sane manimal is overturned when 
he reappears, having hunted her during the beginning of her journey to Chicago. Chorda 
captures Lane, deranged and certain that by eating the heart of “’the most human of 
humans’” he will once again be fully human himself (239). His retention of human-like 
logic, misguided or not, seems to indicate that it might not be his animal DNA driving his 
behavior, but rather could be the actions of an insane human. Or, the clear categories of 
“manimal” and “feral” are not as clear as first believed, as in Rafe’s words: “’Some 
manimals go from sane to feral in a heartbeat. Others turn little by little. Sounds like cat-
chow is halfway there’” (263). And though Lane is once again able to escape Chorda’s 
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grasp, his desperate and deranged logic becomes a tool for her when they meet again in 
Chicago (where Chorda is “King”). She weaves a fairytale-like story that suits Chorda’s 
perception of the virus as a “curse,” indicating that without her love, stealing her heart 
will never break it: “’The beast has to win the girl’s heart, that’s how it works. How it’s 
always worked’” (328). This tactic further indicates the import of story in the Feral 
Zone—it is a tool that can either create a translation of reality (like her father’s bedtime 
stories) or can create a deceptive, and protective, alteration of reality.  
Ultimately, however, while language and storytelling become tools of survival for 
Lane, their failure to fully hold up can be understood in the context of how the material 
reality of the Feral Zone must be acknowledged before all others. Survival is completely 
reliant on the recognition of the Ferae virus’ ability to carry animal DNA across the 
boundaries of the physical self—thus necessitating an acknowledgement of the 
permeability of the self. And (as indicated by Rafe’s comment above about some 
manimals’ gradual shift to feral), language, and the new categorical framework, can only 
offer a cursory understanding of this new reality of material fluidity. Similarly, when 
Lane asks Rafe if there are a lot of ferals in Chicago, he says, “’Yeah, but I hear the 
humans are worse’” (132). All individuals, infected or not, must be understood on a case-
by-case basis and at an interactive, material level. 
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The Material, Trans-corporeal Self 
“The Feral Zone has a way of bringing out the animal in people.” 
(131) 
 
 Life in the Feral Zone is, by nature, a state of perpetual immediacy and 
embeddedness in the present. The terrain is not only populated by the infected, but has 
been abandoned by all governing and policing bodies, thus requiring a continual struggle 
for survival. This perpetual immediacy is coupled with the recognition that one’s physical 
body is no longer (or never was) a contained unit, but rather a porous shape that is 
susceptible to flows and exchanges from other bodies and the environment itself. Living 
in the Feral Zone, then, is living a life that continually acknowledges and affirms Stacy 
Alaimo’s concept of trans-corporeality, as to ignore the porosity of these boundaries is to 
(among many things) deny the possibility of infection. One’s physical vulnerability must 
be recognized before all else. As Rafe explained to Lane—survival in the zone relies not 
only on the reconstruction of discourse and language to suit the new reality, but also the 
recognition of language’s inadequacy in the face of a virus, and an environment, that is, 
ultimately, unpredictable. This constant acknowledgement of vulnerability places a high 
value on the physical, embodied self.  
Life in the Feral Zone values bodies and materiality, sees the truth and stories of 
individuals written on their bodies and doesn’t take them for granted. And in a world 
where threats are so frequently physical, lessons are carved into one’s body—making 
sure that vulnerability and the material threats of the landscape are never forgotten: 
“Lesson. You know” —[Rafe] pointed to a mottled line along his 
collarbone— “don’t lower your weapon until you’re sure the mongrel is 
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dead.” He turned the back of his fist toward me to reveal another scar. 
“Don’t put a wet rock in the fire; it’ll explode.” 
“Learn a lesson, get a scar?” I asked, brows raised. (127) 
Bodies in the Feral Zone, despite their vulnerability and alteration due to Ferae, become 
the only semi-permanent signifiers in a “post-civilization” world. Without the Internet, 
computers, and flame-retardants, the idea of the written word achieving any kind of 
permanence is laughable. Only orally related stories that are anchored in place, like those 
told by Lane’s father, and stories written on the skin, like Rafe’s scar “lessons,” have 
value. And this emphasis on embodied reality even flows over into more abstract 
concepts. For Lane, even thoughts become embodied as animals—creatures prone to 
evolve and grow into new forms: “Understanding crawled out of the primordial mud of 
my mind, tiny and grasping” (17). And when the queen of Chicago is deciding what to do 
with Lane and Rafe, Rafe threatens her saying, if she harms Lane or separates them, “’I 
will stick a steel knife in your happily-ever-after and gouge out its guts’” (291). The 
materiality of the Feral Zone is such that it grounds concepts like happiness and 
understanding in physical form—making them just as vulnerable to destruction as the 
physical bodies of the characters themselves.  
 This material embeddedness is, as I suggested above, a direct result of the trans-
corporeal reality in which residents of the Feral Zone live. They have aligned most 
closely with their physical selves because the body is most readily at risk, but what is 
ultimately more frightening than mere physical harm is the genetic corruption and 
physical alteration of the self to resemble the ontological “other” of the animal. In 
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Chicago, Rafe and Lane encounter a feral hyena-man who has been captured, and the 
encounter finally forces Lane to admit what infection could mean:  
The feral launched himself at the handler with a snarl, only to be brought 
up short by the chain. I glimpsed his awful face, so inhuman and insane, I 
felt my own sanity slipping. Clawing at the air, the slavering thing 
screeched at us. I stumbled back. There was no hint of the man this feral 
had once been. No humanity that I could see left in him at all. He had 
become an it. My whole being flinched at the idea and my control began 
to splinter. Suddenly I understood Rafe so much better. The callous 
distance he put between himself and manimals, his choice to live alone in 
a prison rather than in Moline—he was terrified of becoming a creature 
like this. (279) 
Lane’s response indicates that her fear of the complete physical alteration of her body is 
tightly bound up with a loss of self. (The feral went from a “he” to an “it.”) William 
Larkin observes similar fears in the context of zombie films: “Zombies are peculiarly 
scary because we think that we could be turned into one, and zombies are peculiarly 
tragic figures because we recognize the innocent people that these monsters once were” 
(Larkin 26). He argues that these fears indicate an inherent allegiance to the body over 
the mind as the bearer of self. The zombie is not frightening merely because it infects and 
kills, but because it is, ultimately, still us that would “rise from the dead.” The 
individual’s personhood is not diminished by infection, merely altered—just as the Ferae 
virus alters but does not ultimately negate the embodied self. Even when the virus has 
progressed past the state where reason can be exhibited in the infected’s behavior, like 
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the hyena-man above, its personhood is still present. When, to guarantee their safety 
among the ruthless people of Chicago, Everson is forced to battle and kill the hyena-man, 
he nearly fails through his persistent acknowledgement of the man’s personhood. Though 
he ultimately kills the hyena-man, his hesitation did not go unnoticed, and his punishment 
is to kill a feral every night until he does so without hesitation—Lane is devastated: 
“[They] couldn’t have come up with a worse fate for Everson. To be forced into killing 
infected men night after night or get shot himself?” (Falls 313). Even after Lane’s 
horrified encounter with the same hyena-man she watched Everson kill she is still able to 
see an infected man in him, not just a monster. 
This use of the body as the focal point of self not only indicates an allegiance to 
the material, but also the use of material reality as an indicator of truth. As noted in the 
previous section, words and language can easily be inadequate, faulty, or used to deceive, 
and thus lived experience and the material are all that can be fully trusted. Linguistic truth 
can only be confirmed through material relevance, like in Mack’s stories. The embodied 
self, then, is the true self, one that words and concepts cannot fully communicate. If we 
take, then, the polarity of the Feral Zone and the city, and the valuation of the material in 
the former, and the fear of the material in the latter, a framework of “truth” and 
“deception” can similarly be laid across these spaces. The value of the embodied self is 
thus what constructs the more truthful, gritty reality of the Feral Zone that is continually 
placed in contrast to the pristine and germaphobic city across the wall. In the city, the 
legacy of the Ferae virus is felt through the extreme fear of germs, dirt, and physical 
contact. Lane always carried a bottle of hand sanitizer in her back pocket, one that 
quickly runs out once in the Feral Zone. This replaces the city’s faulty semblance of 
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cleanliness with the realistic approach of the zone: “’You can wash your hands in the 
river. … The only germ that matters is the one that turns you into a slobbering animal. 
And that you can’t catch from a river’” (164). While this proposal initially horrifies her, 
accepting that she will “get dirty” is her first step towards accepting her surroundings and 
intrinsic wildness as a part of herself—accepting her real, material self.   
And once Lane abandons her hand sanitizer, it doesn’t take long before she is 
feeling more fully alive and in tune with the world around her. As Rafe, Everson, and 
Lane pause at dusk on their way to Chicago, Lane observes that, despite the miles ahead 
of them, she “didn’t feel like a girl with an impossible task ahead of her. Instead, my 
body and mind were humming as if the oxygen on this side of the wall were laced with 
caffeine” (197). She senses a richness to the air in the Feral Zone that she had never felt 
before—the oxygen somehow has more to it there than in the city. The obsessive anti-
bacterial cleanliness of the city is underscored as a landscape devoid of life. Though she 
had never understood it, Lane was lacking something on the other side of the wall, and 
now, in the Feral Zone, she is more fully alive—a more truthful incarnation of her real, 
embodied self. And this fullness of self in the Feral Zone is not limited to just Lane. As 
she learns about her father’s visits on this side of the wall—his history with Rafe, his 
romance with the tough and “exotic” Hagen, the loyalty and respect given him by human 
and manimal alike, and even his tendency to cut loose with a mug of moonshine—she 
begins to feel that she had never truly known her father at all. 
In the Feral Zone, the acknowledgement of trans-corporeal flows and physical 
vulnerability is not only necessary for survival, but also for living a rich and full life. 
Taken for granted features of the natural world, such as oxygen, become dynamic figures 
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within a person’s life—ones that physically entwine with the body, leave something 
behind, and then return to share something of that body with the “external” world. As 
Alaimo observes, “…we can foster the sense of enfolding, in which the ‘outside’ is 
always already within, inhabiting and transforming what may or may not be still ‘human’ 
through continual intra-actions. … This sense of trans-corporeality may best be 
understood as posthuman in that material agencies reconfigure the very boundaries of the 
human as such” (Bodily Natures 154). The “humanity” of the Feral Zone, then, is one that 
acknowledges its own more-than-humanity—its always already posthumanity. This flow 
between bodies is inevitable, and the unpredictability, lack of control, and threat of this 
flow and its production of a posthuman reality must thus be not only accepted, but also 
embraced. Ironically, then, by losing control of the boundaries of the self through this 
posthuman reality, one becomes more connected with their material self, and with 
material reality. The physical “mutations” of the Ferae virus can thus be read as a visual 
concretization of the posthuman reality, rather than as an invasive corruption of self. 
 
The Posthuman Feral 
“You mean, let you infect me?” 
“Let me uncage you,” she corrected. (Falls 365) 
 
 If we take that the reality of the posthuman is exhibited in the Feral Zone life 
through the acceptance of porous materiality and the embodied self, we can see the ways 
the posthuman is an inherently feral being. In contemporary usage, feral often implies a 
previous state of domestication, and thus the creature is currently returning to its former 
state of wildness. However, feral is more cyclical than unidirectional, indicating the 
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subject in question is moving between two states while still maintaining an essence of its 
original state of wildness. The posthuman operates in similar ways, particularly if we 
acknowledge the truth of Alaimo’s trans-corporeality, where these flows indicate that we 
have always already been posthuman. The posthuman, much like the feral, indicates that 
the subject is moving between two states: the human and the more-than-human, where 
the human7 can be read as not an actual physical state, but rather a state of consciousness 
that denies interactive material flows, and thus its “true” state of posthumanity. The 
“human” and the “tame” or “domesticated” individual can thus both be seen as states of 
denial—conceptual frameworks that control the self and demarcate between spaces and 
individuals. Lane’s journey in Inhuman shows her movement from this state of denial to 
an acknowledgement of her own inherent wildness and more-than-human self. 
 At the outset of the novel, Lane’s actions are structured by her desire to suppress 
wildness and maintain control over herself, both physically and mentally. She fears the 
intimacy of her peers (who could be carrying germs) and she is disgusted by their lack of 
control: “As much as I loved animals—even the strays—I hated it when boys acted like 
animals. Out of control. Vying for dominance. Ugh” (2). When she is pulled from a party 
with her classmates because of potential infection with Ferae she watches her classmates 
turn “wild” with anger; even a false scare over the virus means they won’t be seeing each 
other in person again for the rest of their senior year. She doesn’t resist being taken away 
by the “jumpsuits” from Biohazard Defense because, she says, “I would much rather be 
poked and prodded in a quarantine center than ripped into bloody chunks by my 
classmates” (13). And the “wild” impulses Lane feels, she suppresses. On her way to the 
                                                
7
 What I call the “human” here is in reference to the Liberal, atomistic individual so pervasive in Western onto-epistemologies: one 
that relies on the designation of strict physical boundaries, and thus is by nature opposed to trans-corporeality. Thus I do not want to 
imply that all contemporary humans fall within this particular framework of denial. 
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quarantine center, one of the “jumpsuits” takes out a needle to draw her blood: “…and 
suddenly I was seized with the urge to bite his hand and free myself. But I didn’t. I 
smothered the impulse; I’d never do something so disgusting. So feral. I relaxed my arm 
and looked away as he inserted the needle” (16). Despite the instinct of self-preservation 
that drives her wild impulse, she nonetheless suppresses it to avoid such “disgusting” and 
“feral” behavior.  
 Lane’s own desire for control, and her belief that it operates along species lines, 
thus frames the way she approaches the Feral Zone. When she is berating Rafe for 
attempting to kill Chorda, she points out that he is “’still part human’” and that “’humans 
can control their impulses.’” To which Rafe asks, “’What humans have you been hanging 
around with?’” (134). Lane’s assumption that humans should control themselves and act 
predictably, is directly contrasted on the next page when she refuses to take her eye off a 
coyote that watches her and Rafe: “I don’t know what I expected it to do, but I wasn’t 
taking any chances. It was a wild animal after all” (135). Though she maintains her 
demarcation of control and wildness along species lines, she already seems to be 
indicating that she isn’t sure why she thinks “wild” animals will always be aggressive and 
violent. And though Lane clearly prefers her clean and controlled city across the wall, she 
acknowledges the different circumstances, and that what she calls “civilized behavior [is] 
a thing of the past” (135). She rapidly comes to value the wilderness survival classes her 
father had made her take, and she is continually trying to prove herself to be capable of 
surviving in the Feral Zone. Rafe, however, sees her as domesticated, and continually 
refers to her as a tame “silky;” Lane tries to defend herself, 
“I’m not tame.” 
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He snorted. “Right. You’re petted and pampered and fed on demand. All 
you’re missing is a jeweled collar.” (128) 
While she is offended by the comparison to a lapdog, she acknowledges that she is out of 
her depth in the Feral Zone, and Rafe, who she initially identifies as “all street dog” with 
eyes that “had the shine of a wild animal cornered in its den,” has the skills to help her 
survive (78, 110). This movement signals Lane’s shift from smothering her “wild” 
survival impulses to valuing the power and moral strength that comes with accepting 
these instincts. 
 However, Lane’s major shifts in acceptance of her wild instincts do not occur 
until they reach Chicago and witness the horrors that the humans who rule there inflict 
upon the infected. Not long after their arrival, Cosmo, an eight-year-old second-
generation feral carrying the genetics of human, arctic fox, and chimpanzee that they 
befriended on the road, is brutally beaten to death by the “handlers” of the Chicago court. 
After the horror of watching Cosmo die, the cruelty inflicted on other infected people 
living in cages “was one cruelty too many. Something inside of me snapped and suddenly 
I knew how it must feel to go feral” (336). And once that “something inside of [her] 
snapped,” Lane was willing to accept her inherent wildness to achieve her goals. When 
Rafe is captured by Chorda and placed in his “zoo” alongside dozens of caged ferals, 
Lane is determined to rescue him no matter what the risk. So when Everson, ever the 
practical line guard, sees the futility in this rescue mission and attempts to stop her, Lane 
savagely bites his hand in order to flee. Her action here can be placed in direct contrast to 
her suppression of the same urge at the beginning of the novel. Lane has begun to see the 
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control that she once tightly held on her wilder impulses might not be the personal, 
human, strength she once believed, but rather a weakness of resolve.  
 It is this belief that causes her to pause when offered the chance to be infected 
with the lion strain of Ferae. The pack of lionesses in Chorda’s zoo is, in fact, all of his 
previous queens that he had infected and locked away once he tired of them. Their power, 
and lust for revenge, is what convinces Lane to recruit them in her rescue mission. And 
when the fight is over, Lane has impressed them with her strength of will, so the leader, 
Mahari, makes her an offer: 
“You don’t have to go,” Mahari said, smoothing her tattered gown. She 
eyed me. “You could join us.” 
I stared at her, not quite sure what she was offering. 
“You’re a lioness. You know you are.” She smiled, revealing her ivory 
fangs. 
“You mean, let you infect me?” 
“Let me uncage you,” she corrected. 
The temptation was there, all right. To be strong … so fast … so 
terrifying. What would it feel like to move through the world so 
powerfully and with such confidence? “I want to be a lioness,” I breathed. 
“I do. But I’m going to try doing it without the virus.” (365) 
Mahari’s reframing of the virus as a way of uncaging the self rather than infecting it 
helps place the ferals firmly within the framework of the posthuman. If we think of the 
current conception of the human as not our true form, but rather a frame of consciousness 
that separates the individual from its environment and denies its fluid posthumananity, 
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Mahari is offering a way to free Lane from that restrictive consciousness, and thus a way 
to free her true self. And Lane sees the power behind Mahari’s offer, but acknowledges 
that the power she wants doesn’t require the virus, but rather an acceptance of her own 
posthumanity and inner wildness. So when Lane turns down the offer, Mahari is 
unconcerned: “’Well, if you ever decide you want the trimmings’—Mahari extended her 
claws—‘give me a roar’” (365). For Mahari and Lane the actual lioness is not a matter of 
genetic corruption, it is already physically present and merely requires a conscious 
acknowledgement of its existence. The visually evident incarnations of the lioness are 
merely “trimmings” on a broader expanse of self.  
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, Rafe’s sly comment that “’[t]he 
Feral Zone has a way of bringing out the animal in people’” was not merely a jab at Lane, 
but an indication that the human and animal are not, and never have been, separate (131). 
They are merely two components of a more expansive and fluid, trans-corporeal, 
posthuman self. And with the truth-exposing, self-affirming nature of the Feral Zone, this 
space helps people acknowledge and “bring out” their always already present animal-
selves. However, it is important to note here that these “animal-selves” are not to be used 
as an escapist tool. As Cary Wolfe observes in his book, Animal Rites: American Culture, 
the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory, we should approach “nonhuman 
animals not as the other-than-human but as the infrahuman, not as the primitive and pure 
other we rush to embrace as a way to cure our own existential malaise, but as part of us, 
of us…” (Wolfe 17). Similarly, the Feral Zone cannot be merely seen as a place where 
one can escape from the failures of humanity and replace this existence with another, but 
rather a place that forces one to accept their already existent posthuman plurality of self. 
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Feral is Free 
I could see the double image in his face, like an Escher drawing, 
the human beneath the tiger. (Falls 238) 
 
Is “going feral” an infection and corruption of the self? Or an uncaging of the 
self? Is it “risking your humanity” (109)? Or is humanity something to be ashamed of 
(303)? Once Lane passes over into the Feral Zone, the lesson she learns above all else is 
that nothing is as clear-cut and categorically evident as she had once believed. Even the 
new set of classifications adopted by the residents of the Feral Zone to make sense of this 
post-Ferae world must be acknowledged as limiting—only able to capture the truth in 
part. Living in such a materially threatening environment forces a constant recognition of 
(and adaptation to) vulnerability and change. And while the virus is still predominantly 
seen as one of the greatest threats of living in the zone, many have embraced the freedom 
that comes with infection. The visually evident flow of matter across physical “barriers” 
produced by the viral mutations allows the infected to embrace their more-than-human, 
wild, true self.  
The genetic corruption with animal DNA thus becomes not a threat but a kind of 
gift that helps establish a self more embedded and in tune with its environment. This self 
can also be seen as one freed from the isolation and denial that comes with an allegiance 
to the pure human: this posthuman self is an embodiment of Deborah Bird Rose’s 
ecological existentialist movements from atomism to connectivity and certainty to 
uncertainty. And the “cage” that Mahari spoke of can be translated as the faulty 
conception of the human as a contained unit held separate from nature. The human is thus 
more accurately rendered through a posthuman framework, where the boundaries of the 
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human are porous, and the animal “other” is already a component of a plural self. And 
Lane’s move at the novel’s conclusion to become a lioness “without the virus” reaffirms 
this plurality. The virus is just a tool to reveal these pluralities, and not what has, 
ultimately, created them. The inherent porosity of bodies and their consequent and 
continuous intertwining with their environment (and other bodies) is what has 
constructed the human as an already posthuman being. As the quote at the beginning of 
this section indicates, this posthuman plurality of self is merely a matter of perspective, as 
different approaches reveal different aspects of self—just as different approaches reveal 
different images and realities within an Escher drawing. As Alice Curry notes, these 
narratives are particularly essential in the YA novel,  
As young adults approach that further border—the far more permeable 
border separating childhood from adulthood—such a reconceptualization 
is not only ecologically relevant and appropriate, but also ethically, 
epistemologically and spiritually responsible. (191) 
We will explore this plurality of self, and Alice Curry’s concept of the ecological hybrid, 
further in the next chapter in the context of Sweet Tooth’s posthuman-hybrid utopia. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
“MAN’S TIME WAS DONE.” 
THE POSTHUMAN ECOTOPIA OF JEFF LEMIRE’S  
SWEET TOOTH 
 
 
I really think [Sweet Tooth is] about trying to look at the world in a 
different way. What I mean by that is, if you look around at the state of the 
world, it’s pretty easy to see that it’s not a great place. There’s a lot of 
terrible things going on in the world. We’re not treating each other very 
well. It’s going back to that idea that we’re all connected, and getting back 
to a simpler way of life. Gus and the hybrid kids really represent that. 
They’re the innocence of childhood. When you’re a kid, you’re not as 
corrupted by the world at large. You’re not corrupted by prejudices. 
You’re much more open-minded. Much more interested in the world 
around you. Sweet Tooth is about the world returning to that kind of place. 
(Lemire, “The End of ‘Sweet Tooth’”) 
 
 
Jeff Lemire’s New York Times bestselling 40-issue comic Sweet Tooth (2009-
2013, collected in 6 volumes) presents a utopian project where humans have been 
replaced with god-like human-animal hybrids whose existence enables the construction 
of an ecotopia. The human-animal hybrids of Sweet Tooth offer valuable insight into the 
posthuman subject; one characterized by the complete dissolution of the boundaries 
separating humans from the “other.” They exhibit a “complex interpenetration of 
supposedly binary categories … and the field on which this messy blurring of boundaries 
occurs is the human body itself” (Hughes 38). The ecotopian conclusion to the series 
depicts these hybrid children’s inheritance of the earth. In this utopia, the posthuman 
hybrid is an embodiment of the self-other binary where the human-self materially exists 
alongside the animal-other, necessitating an embodied and simultaneous self-and-other 
identification. This subject thus produces a posthuman consciousness: an 
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acknowledgment of a plural self, where sameness and difference interact and mingle 
materially.  
Set in the post-apocalyptic United States, Sweet Tooth follows the story of Gus, a 
boy who lives in the woods of Nebraska with his father, and who bears the features of a 
deer. The story is set in the aftermath of a pandemic, caused by the virus “H5-G9,” that 
has wiped out the vast majority of the population, leaving behind power-hungry 
“Militias” as the sole authorities, and a new “species” of hybrid children. All babies born 
since the pandemic resemble a hybridization of human and animal, an inexplicable 
development that also comes with immunity to H5-G9, an immunity the Militia are 
determined to harness. After the death of Gus’s father to “The Sick,” Gus is tricked and 
captured by the Militia and brought to their compound. The first half of the serial follows 
Gus and his hybrid friends Wendy (pig-girl) and Bobby (groundhog-boy) as they escape 
the Militia with the help of a small group of faithful humans led by Gus’s tough-guy 
protector, the ex-hockey player Tommy Jepperd. The group also includes rescued 
prostitutes, Lucy and Becky, Johnny (the turn-coat brother of the Militia leader Abbot), 
and Dr. Singh, who abandoned the Militia after meeting Gus, as Gus’s lack of a belly 
button (indicating he was not “born”) leads him to believe learning Gus’s origins will 
reveal the true cause of the pestilence. The latter half of the serial details the group’s 
journey to Alaska—where Gus was “born”—as they search for the truth behind the 
hybrids.  
Human-Animal Material Continuity 
 Just as Dren from Splice and the ferals from Inhuman skirt the borders between 
worlds, identities, and species, so too do the hybrid children of Sweet Tooth. And the 
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particular format of the comic book, allowing for the layering and juxtaposition of images 
on the page, offers a unique insight into the material continuity between the human, 
animal, and the human-animal hybrid. Lemire uses these techniques particularly to play 
with moments of material conflation and confusion, and to draw out similarities between 
figures. These confusions are articulated from the start in the first installation of Sweet 
Tooth: Out of the Deep Woods. After the death of Gus’s father, as Gus buries him he 
observes that now it is “just me…me and the deep woods” (ellipsis original, Out of the 
Deep Woods 22). A branch cracks and a buck-deer emerges beside him, startling Gus. 
The full-page panel detailing their encounter is overlaid by two other panels, the first 
shows Gus’s startled eyes, the other shows the deer’s (see fig. 12). These panels directly 
contrast the deer-boy and the buck-deer, showing that Gus is certainly not alone, and 
providing the animal counterpart of his dead human-father figure. This motif of panels 
detailing just the eyes of characters is a common one throughout the comic, particularly 
in the context of Gus and his stand-in father figure, Jepperd, which we will return to in a 
moment. The figures of Gus and the deer are further materially confused in the following 
panel, as the deer is mistaken for Gus by hybrid-poachers, and is shot dead in front of 
him. Gus flees, leaving the deer’s body beside the grave of his father. This deer-father 
figure, then, also dies protecting Gus, just as his human-father did while sheltering him 
from the world outside the woods. Gus is then rendered both positively, and horribly, not 
alone in the “deep woods,” as he is both protected and threatened by his material 
continuity between the human and the animal.  
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       Fig. 12. Gus encounters a deer. 
When the hybrid-poachers catch up with Gus he is barely saved in time by 
Jepperd, whose search for a hybrid child happened to bring him to the deep woods. Of 
course, though Jepperd kills the poachers, he is in fact looking for a hybrid to trade with 
the Militia for the bones of his dead wife, Lucille, who died in childbirth a few years 
prior. Jepperd’s approach to Gus is thus purely out of instrumental interest, an emotional 
distancing that is troubled when he first looks into Gus’s frightened and innocent face 
(see fig. 13). This set of panels clearly reflects the similar moment between Gus and the 
deer. Merely looking into Gus’s eyes seems to draw out a protective impulse in those 
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around him—whether human or animal. With one look into Gus’s wide and innocent 
eyes, the deer sacrificed itself, and here, Jepperd’s quintessential scowl is immediately 
lifted and he already appears to be becoming emotionally attached to the boy.  
 
      Fig. 13 Gus and Jepperd meet. 
In the following panels he, for the most part, gives up his rugged and standoffish 
demeanor, and assures Gus that he has no intention of hurting him. In both scenes, the 
juxtaposition of panels just showing the eyes of the figures draws further similarities 
between them. Gus and the deer have much in common, just as Gus and Jepperd do, thus 
further placing Gus in the position of material comingling of the human and the animal. 
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And, importantly, though there are no panels directly comparing Jepperd with the deer, 
the focus on the eyes for both scenes implies similarities across the spectrum of human, 
hybrid, and animal.  
These similarities drawn between Jepperd and animals, as mediated through Gus, 
are particularly evident in Issue 21, “Endangered Species Part 2,” when Jepperd and Gus 
encounter a bear. As the bear comes running after them, Gus falls to the ground before he 
can reach Jepperd, placing him between the bear’s hungry jaws and Jepperd with his rifle 
(see fig. 14). Gus’s placement between the human and the animal clearly portrays both 
his material location on the margin between human and animal, but also the relative 
similarities between Jepperd and the bear, as both are tough survivors with particular 
interests in the boy. The inset panels within the larger image capture the bear’s hungry 
jaws (seemingly its most dangerous feature) and Gus and Jepperd’s attention to that 
threat. At this point in the encounter, Gus and Jepperd are placed together—their inset-
paneled eyes are beside one another on the right side of the image—and the bear is 
juxtaposed on the left as the threatening other. In the panels detailing Jepperd shooting 
the bear, Gus is again placed in between the two figures. The blue background of 
Jepperd’s panel lightens to purple where Gus is, and then lightens further to a reddish hue 
in the bear’s panel—further indicating Gus’s in-betweenness, his mingling of the human 
and the animal. 
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Fig. 14. The two-page initial encounter between Gus, Jepperd, and the bear. 
The shot barely slows the bear down before it destroys the rifle with one swing of its paw 
and then knocks Jepperd out with the other. It is important to pause here and also note the 
parallel story line that is being played out in the bottom tier of this page, and throughout 
the entire issue. The upper portion of the pages are dedicated to the bear encounter 
(which is a silent encounter), while the bottom portion details Lucy, Becky, and Wendy’s 
interactions with “Walter Fish,” a seemingly harmless man who lives in a dam converted 
into a greenhouse and living space. This juxtaposition of encounters serves as a hint of 
what’s to come, as despite the cozy atmosphere Fish inhabits, the “honesty” of his 
storytelling and the “civilized” nature of the tea and cookies he has laid out, the girls are 
in just as much danger as Gus and Jepperd. Later on in the comic it is revealed that Fish 
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is in fact a rapist and murder, who killed the previous inhabitants of the dam, and 
eventually he attempts to keep teenaged Becky for himself. The synchronous storylines 
are also important because by the end of the issue we learn that Lucy is showing early 
signs of the Sick—the only thing that Jepperd cannot protect them from. 
What must be considered “threatening” must also, then, be questioned—a 
confusion that is reinforced once Jepperd has been knocked unconscious and the bear has 
a chance to look more closely at Gus (see fig. 15). Here the bear stops and looks at Gus; 
he is thoroughly confused: is this creature a deer, or a human? Thought boxes emerge 
over the bear’s head, images of first a deer then a human appear with question marks 
beside them—which is it? 
 
     Fig. 15. Is Gus human, a deer, or a god? 
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This combination is likely to be doubly confusing for the bear, as Gus’s particular hybrid 
make-up conflates a prey species with a threatening predatory species. Then, in the bear’s 
vision, Gus morphs into a red stylized idol-like figure of a human-deer hybrid and, still 
confused, but now fascinated, the bear takes Gus back to his cave unharmed. The bear’s 
threat towards Gus is thus neutralized—though, of course, Gus’s fear for Jepperd, and of 
the bear, are unquestionably still present. It is important to also note here that the 
thought-box deer is standing on an earthen surface, while the human seems to be floating 
in space. The “pure” animal figure is thus contextualized—the deer cannot exist away 
from its environment, it is materially embedded in such a manner that without its 
environment, perhaps it is no longer a deer. The “drifting” human could perhaps also 
indicate the ways in which our conceptualization of the human is decontextualized to the 
extent that it is no longer reflective of reality, a conception that merely reinforces the 
need for a materially reintegrated posthuman consciousness. 
When Jepperd wakes, despite his injuries and the loss of his rifle, he quickly 
follows the bear’s tracks, armed now with only a knife. At the mouth of the cave, Jepperd 
and the bear once again have a stand-off with Gus sprawled on the ground between them. 
Here, Lemire uses a spread of three panels across two pages (see fig. 16): the central 
panel shows the “stand-off” with thought-circles connecting Jepperd to the far left panel 
and the bear to the far right. Jepperd’s thought is a split frame of the left side of Gus’s 
frightened face; the bear’s thought is a split frame of the right side of Gus’s face—
rendered in the bear’s own stylized-idol version of Gus, a version that looks more 
powerful and threatening than frightened.  
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Fig. 16. Jepperd and the bear have Gus on their minds as they prepare to fight. 
This panel framework again reiterates both the similarities between Jepperd and the bear 
as well as the hybrid nature of Gus—but here Gus’s hybridity is also rendered through 
the different but intersecting perceptions of him. Jepperd sees Gus’s youth and 
vulnerability, while the bear sees him as a superior god-like being. This hints at the future 
conflations of meaning for the hybrids, as they are later revealed to exactly resemble Inuit 
gods, but are also still perceived by some humans to be a “new race [that] would be 
forever innocent and pure” (In Captivity 113). Gus is here a conflation of vulnerability 
and power, just like Dren, though his power is as yet unrecognized and untapped.  
This conflation is an issue we will return to in the next section—are the hybrids 
hunters or the hunted? As the cover for Issue 5 (“Out of the Deep Woods Conclusion”) 
indicates (see fig. 17), the hybrids are not only the hunted, but they are creatures to be 
kept as trophies.  
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Fig. 17. Gus as a trophy wall-mount on the cover for Issue 5. 
Whether or not the Militia is able to find the cure from the hybrid children they capture, 
the hunting, capturing, and killing of them is valuable enough as sport. It is also a way of 
re-establishing control over a world that has become filled with uncertainties—the 
primary of which being when one will eventually succumb to the virus. This issue cover 
is almost exactly replicated as the title pages for the collected volumes 1-5, further 
indicating the role of vulnerability the hybrid children play in these volumes, and creating 
a break of pattern for the final volume where it is the hybrids, not the human Militia, that 
come out on top. 
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Thus, in this case, Gus’s conflation of power and vulnerability means Jepperd and 
the bear both wish to protect Gus, but for very different reasons. And despite the bear’s 
fascination and seeming idolatry for Gus, both Jepperd and Gus still see it as threatening 
and vicious, and the encounter ends in Jepperd killing the bear to free the boy. In this 
way, despite Gus’s role as a material conflation, or conduit, between the human and 
animal—the self and other—the mind of the other is still an unknown.  This is an 
important distinction, as Gus’s hybridity does not collapse difference between human and 
animal, but rather opens up a pathway to connectivity. The posthuman hybrid figure does 
not absorb the other into itself so much as bring forth already present connectivities—
thus preventing the homogenizing tendencies of holistic idealism, an issue we will return 
to later. 
 
Words Made Flesh 
“It was a hybrid…now it’s a message.” (Wild Game 96) 
 
The comic book medium is also a particularly fitting locus for investigating 
hybridity and material continuity because of its own hybrid nature. The juxtaposition of 
words and images on the page provide a place for textual meaning to flow over onto/into 
material bodies. As Stacy Alaimo observes, “…human corporeality and textuality 
effortlessly extend into the more-than-human world. Word, flesh, and dirt are no longer 
discrete” (Bodily Natures 14). Lemire artfully renders these conflations of flesh and 
meaning through his issue title-page splashes. A particularly key mirrored pair are those 
from Issue 2 (“Out of the Deep Woods Part 2”) and Issue 29 (“Unnatural Habitats Part 
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1”). In these splashes, the issue titles are written in the blood of the respective fallen 
individuals. In the first, Jepperd, in protecting Gus has collapsed from blood loss (see fig. 
18), and in the second, a rabbit that Jepperd has just shot for food lies steaming in the 
snow (see fig. 19). 
		  
Fig. 18 Jepperd, fallen while protecting Gus. Fig. 19 The rabbit killed for Jepperd’s meal. 
The mirroring of these images draw similarities between Jepperd and the rabbit. Not only 
are they both animals, mammals that can bleed, but are also both sacrifices—sacrifices 
for something bigger than either of them. The first image comes very early in the comic, 
when Jepperd is trying to see Gus as merely an item of trade so he can get the bones of 
his wife back from the Militia. His role in Gus’s life, however, will be much bigger than 
that—a role of sacrifice for the good of Gus and the other hybrid children. The rabbit, 
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similarly, is a sacrifice to nourish Jepperd as he protects Gus—a sacrifice that is clearly 
beyond the rabbit’s comprehension. In both contexts, then, their roles as sacrificial 
figures are as yet hidden from both of them. 
The use of their blood as script further indicates that their bodies are not merely 
their own, but move beyond them as signifiers—they are read-able. In the second image, 
the captions of Jepperd’s internal monologue help place these bodies into a binary 
context: 
And out here it’s survival of the fittest. You’re either the hunter or you’re 
the food. 
And I decided a long time ago which one I was gonna be.  
(Unnatural Habitats 73)  
Jepperd and the rabbit, though similar in some respects, are still placed within a human-
animal and hunter-food binary context. He indicates that there are only two options in 
this world, and the role of the human hunter is the role of the survivor, so in order to 
survive, there really is no choice. But on the next page, when Gus meets Jepperd at the 
campsite, his monologue shifts: “But then I met the boy. And before I knew it, I had a 
purpose again” (Unnatural Habitats 74). Gus’s return thus tells us that there is more than 
just this binary. There is more than just human and animal—there is the hybrid, and there 
is more than just the hunter and the hunted—there is the protector, and thus there is a 
context of historicity and future: life is more than just the present struggle. And the 
hybrid body itself is used further throughout the comic as a symbolic figure. When 
Abbot, the leader of the Militia who is tracking down Gus and his friends, kills a crow-
boy, one of his men, shocked, yells “Jesus Christ! It’s a hybrid!” to which Abbot replies, 
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“It was a hybrid…now it’s a message” (ellipsis original, Wild Game 96). While in this 
circumstance Abbot plans to use the boy’s dead body as a threat, his words merely 
reinforce the ways in which the hybrid body signifies so much more. The hybrid’s 
message to humankind is the need for change, the need to move beyond the current 
atomistic and restrictive worldviews. The hybrid body is a break from binaristic thinking, 
a move towards connectivity and community: it is the posthuman subject made flesh. 
 And, because of the hybrid figure’s artistic rendering through hand-drawn images, 
one can also look at the ways the hybrid figure emerges through the physical act of 
converting metaphysical symbolism to material image. The images themselves can be 
physically touched and manipulated as the reader flips through the comic—producing a 
material interaction with the figure. And, interestingly, even the first rendering of Gus by 
Lemire seemed to be more of a result of his body taking the lead, rather than a conscious 
decision or thought. On the origin of Gus, Lemire says: 
As for the idea of animal-human hybrids and hybrid children… I really 
wish I did know where that came from! For some reason, I started drawing 
this kid with antlers – I didn’t even know when that started – and a story 
emerged: A kid with antlers, living in a cabin in the woods with his dad. It 
evolved from there. (ellipsis original, “The End of 'Sweet Tooth'”) 
The posthuman figure of the hybrid, then, seemed to materially produce itself—a trans-
corporeal flow from Lemire’s hand, to the pen, to the page. It was not so much just a 
story that needed telling, but rather the posthuman that required visual rendering: a 
material form from which to operate symbolically and build its own story. 
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 For storytelling’s role in Sweet Tooth cannot be overemphasized. Throughout the 
comic we have Gus’s father’s “bible” (which records both his pseudo religion and 
prophetic hints at what’s to come) and Dr. Singh’s “tapes” (telling his origin story and his 
hopes for the future) as well as guest artists telling the stories of Becky, Lucy, Wendy, 
Johnny and Abbot and the backstory of the plague’s origin. Storytelling is a key 
component of the different characters’ understandings of self—a way of remembering 
themselves. Emphasizing the importance of story, Lemire also plays with the typical 
vertical layout of the comic surface and instead draws two issues (18 and 33) using a 
horizontal visual style, creating a “storybook” feel. This format is then coupled with an 
abstracted narrative where the characters become known by figurations rather than their 
actual names. Becky is the “The Pretty Girl;” Jepperd, “The Big Man;” Lucy, “The Nice 
Lady;” and Johnny, “The Man With The Funny Eyes.” This helps construct a kind of 
allegorical storytelling style—it isn’t so much the characters themselves that matter, but 
rather what they represent. And this feeling is reinforced even through the characters’ 
actual names. All the unquestionably “good” characters (aside from Gus) have names 
ending in “y”: Wendy, Lucy, Becky, Jimmy, Johnny, Buddy, Tommy, Bobby, etc. The 
names are almost interchangeable in their similarity, thus not only structuring the roles 
rather than the characters as vital, but also emphasizing the role of stories and storytelling 
within the community as essential, rather than the events those stories depict. 
 The final issue (“Home Sweet Home”) could not underscore this more completely 
through its ongoing narrative motif of “this is a story….” The story of Gus and his 
friends, their adventures and their struggles, become not just their own stories, but also 
 81 
the story of the hybrid: a story that helps them to never forget their earthly context and 
fallibility: 
 And this is a story of compassion. This is a story of how the last humans 
stopped fighting and came to the hybrids not as enemies … but rather as 
refugees. This is the story of how the hybrids let go of fear and hatred. 
And, despite being hunted and hated themselves … still helped mankind in 
their final passage out of this world. This is also a story of remembrance. 
Because they knew, to forget how they had gotten here—to forget the 
sacrifices made to get them here—would mean to repeat the mistakes of 
man. Despite their differences—despite their scars—they all stood 
together once a year and remembered. They remembered their fathers and 
they remembered themselves. They weren’t just strangers bound by 
history and fate … they were family. And this was their story.  
(ellipses original, Wild Game 188-189) 
These stories are not timeless like fairytales—not like the stories Lane’s father in 
Inhuman told her before bed—but are instead historically situated and constructed in 
order to help build and support a thriving future. The story moves beyond the individual 
and expands to chart the journey of a family—a community of earth others. In contrast to 
Inhuman, then, Sweet Tooth looks beyond the present to imagine possible futures. It 
doesn’t merely cope with and adapt to the circumstances at hand, it builds a life out of 
them. As the narration notes in the final issue: “But the story didn’t end here. In fact it 
was really only just beginning…” (ellipsis original, Wild Game 191).  
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Cultivating a Posthuman Consciousness 
“Man’s time was done. They had their chance to live in harmony 
with the land and they failed. Then we were born. The hybrid. We 
are one with the land. One with the animals that walk it.”  
(Wild Game 169) 
 
 And the life the hybrid children build, the story they begin, is unquestionably 
utopian. As Lemire himself said, “we are all looking for a better way, or a different way, 
to make real change in the world, or change the course we’re on” (emphasis original, 
“The End of ‘Sweet Tooth’”). Because the primary catalyst and figurehead for this 
utopian world is the human-animal hybrid, it is thus important to track the ways human-
animal relationships (and self-other figurations) are idealistically framed. In Lucy 
Sargisson’s compelling essay “Green Utopias of Self and Other,” she explores the ways 
in which many ecotopias, particularly those in the holistic tradition of deep ecology, too 
often idealize “a conceptual widening of Self to include the Other,” which can potentially 
“result in a massive assertion of Self, and of sameness that serves to deny the Other its 
conceptual autonomy” (144, 145). “This approach to the Other,” she writes, “is based on 
affinity and identity and on the belief that it is possible to know the Other …. It assumes 
ontological access to the Other,” which, she asserts, “is problematic” (145-146). While 
Sweet Tooth does construct a utopian integration of the self and other, and one that is in 
part based off of “affinity and identity,” it is not one that results in the “massive assertion 
of Self” that Sargisson warns against. 
Sweet Tooth concludes with the complete die-off of the human species from the 
H5-G9 virus, and the construction of a new hybrid civilization. The founding structure of 
this new society is framed through a prayer Gus leads before dinner with his two sons, 
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Tommy and Richard (who bear the features of both a deer and pig, inherited from Gus 
and their mother, Wendy), and his friend Bobby. Before eating, Gus lifts up the hide of 
the rabbit they are about to eat, and leads this prayer: 
The gods have given us this rabbit…this animal that is one of us…to 
sustain us.8 And for that we are grateful. And we must never forget…the 
gods once lived in harmony with man. But man forgot their faces and 
turned to sin and death. And as their world crumbled around them they 
tried to touch the gods again…to recreate them with science. But this was 
forbidden. And the gods sent a pestilence. Their breath on the wind. Man’s 
time was done. They had their chance to live in harmony with the land and 
they failed.  
Then we were born. The hybrid. We are one with the land. One with the 
animals that walk it. But we also carry mankind’s legacy in our blood and 
bones, so that we never forget that we are no better than they. We too can 
fall. We too can fail. We must never forget the face of the gods as man 
did.…for their faces are our faces. And for that we leave this hide to feed 
the wolves. An offering back to the land that sustains us.  
  (ellipses original, Wild Game 169-170) 
This prayer shows how Gus and the new hybrid society see their own Self-Other 
constructedness: they are “one with the land. One with the animals that walk it,” and 
“carry mankind’s legacy in [their] blood and bones” (my emphasis, 169). Their identities 
are thus primarily constituted in relation to their environment and earth others. Just as the 
                                                
8 This rabbit can also be seen as a mirror of the one Jepperd killed earlier in the comic. The role of sacrifice, of altruism and give-and-
take, within the context of their new utopian community is essential for its success.  
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bear’s thought-bubble-deer was defined in relation to the earth, so too are the hybrids. 
They thus deny a full identification with the decontextualized human, but by carrying the 
human “legacy” materially, they prevent themselves from forgetting their own fallibility. 
Thus, despite its failures, the human must continue to exist, if only as a warning against 
their mistakes for the future generations of hybrids. 
 In this way, Gus comes to outwardly align and identify most closely with his 
“othered” components and identities (animal, hybrid, etc.), in some cases even denying 
previous human attachments. Though he continues to tell his children stories of his 
adventures with “The Big Man” (in part as a way to never forget the human legacy they 
carry), he refuses to divulge information about his previous romance with the human girl, 
Becky. He says there is “no point in them knowing, I guess,” despite Bobby’s lament: “it 
am shame [sic] no one remembers her. She was so nice” (Wild Game 175). Gus’s denial 
of Becky’s memory helps him maintain a construction of the pure human-other as a 
negative figure, and one with which full identification should be avoided at all cost. In 
some ways this decision erases much of the good of humanity from hybrid memory, but 
as this helps structure his children’s self-identification, as well as the rest of the hybrid-
society, it is a seemingly small sacrifice for the good of hybrid-kind (and the earth’s 
future). The hybrid is thus a material conflation of the human and animal, the self and 
other, but one that maintains a dual-consciousness, acknowledging the different 
components of the hybrid as both integrated, but also just that—different.  
This self-other utopian construction, then, exhibits both a material conflation of 
the self-and-other, but also a conscious recognition of difference. The hybrids are thus 
expected to maintain a hybrid-consciousness—simultaneously identifying as both human 
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and animal, as well as differentiating between the two “selves” and recognizing the 
fallibility of this duality. This hybrid formation reflects Alice Curry’s “ecological 
hybrid,” which she defines as “physiological embodiments of multiplicity; they manifest 
dual or plural subject positions, identities and perspectives. They actively refute the deep 
ecological tendency towards … assimilation of the other into the human self by 
articulating the distinctness of both self and other” (181). This posthuman subject, Curry 
asserts, has powerful counter-hegemonic potential because it denies the binaristic 
thinking evident in self-other distinctions by adopting a plurality of self. Multiple 
“positions, identities and perspectives” converge in the ecological hybrid, and through an 
acceptance of this multiplicity the subject has considerable agential power as it operates 
beyond the restrictiveness of binaries. As Curry goes on to explain, 
Through challenging the borders of the self—not simply the body but the 
emotions, mind and identity—these [figures] extend a further challenge to 
the discursive borders structuring contemporary environmental 
representation. To imagine the environment not as a setting or background 
but as a fully agential ecological entity is to reconceptualize the borders of 
human identity according to humanity’s intimate enmeshment in the earth. 
(191) 
This reconceptualization of the borders of the human reinforces the role of the ecological 
hybrid as a posthuman figuration. This hybrid opens the gates of possibility for 
expression of the posthuman by troubling borders and categories and bridging the 
boundaries between not only material bodies, but also conceptual ones. The hybrid 
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figuration and plural-selves of Gus and his friends can thus be seen as components of a 
utopian posthuman that evolved out of the failures of the atomistic human. 
 
A Posthuman Utopia 
Instead of a human future of utopian technological miracles or 
dystopian technological destruction, [these stories] imagine a 
nonhuman future in which the natural world flourishes. … These 
works might represent a change in our understanding. We now 
begin to understand a perfect or just world as one without humans. 
(Jendrysik 35-36) 
 
 In Mark S. Jendrysik’s essay “Back to the Garden: New Visions of Posthuman 
Futures,” he explores the way that many contemporary visions of ideal worlds see utopia 
as only achievable in a world where technology and man have been eradicated:  
These [utopias] project a new Garden of Eden blossoming on an Earth 
freed of the malign influence of human beings. They are oddly hopeful, 
asking us to understand our own demise as a sacrifice for the good of 
nature. … They might be an ironic form of critical utopia, suggesting that 
humans recognize that we are the greatest obstacle to utopia.  
(Jendrysik 35-36) 
This ecological utopia, or ecotopia, is then “distinctive insofar as it uncouples the hope of 
a better future from hegemonic discourses of progress and advances a ‘radically different 
conception of happiness and the good life’” (Garforth 396). In Jendrysik’s look at futures 
devoid of humanity (as exhibited through shows and documentaries such as Aftermath: 
Population Zero and Life After People), he stresses that since these works represent 
humanity as “doomed, we seek to reassure ourselves that we have not brought nature 
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down with us. As such these works are not calls to action. Instead they ask us to take a 
position of hopeful acceptance of our end” (48). This stance could produce a kind of 
apathy towards change, or, because of Sweet Tooth’s unique trans-corporeal 
representation of the human and animal, it could induce the production of a new 
conception of the human—the posthuman. This move would replace the damaging and 
false conception of the atomistic separation of humans from nature, and move towards an 
acceptance of the connectivity and uncertainty evident in a truly agential world. Thus, 
rather than deeming utopia as only possible through the complete eradication of humans, 
one could see instead the atomistic construction of the human as the figure worth 
discarding in favor of the posthuman, ecologically hybrid, conception of self outlined in 
the previous section. 
 What would be needed, then, is an alteration of consciousness rather than a 
removal of bodies. It is the idea of the human9 that is the problem, not the species itself. 
Narratives of this kind would thus undermine the apathy Jendrysik describes, and would 
reinforce the need for consideration and change of the “human” existence. Just before the 
final battle made to protect the hybrids from the Militia, Jepperd says to Gus,  
“One thing we do know…one thing we can’t argue about is that sooner or 
later the plague gets all of us…all of us humans I mean. But not you. You 
kids are safe from it. And I gotta keep it that way. Hell. Maybe that’s why 
I lasted as long as I have.”  
(ellipses original, Wild Game 108) 
Jepperd recognizes the futility of preserving the human, and sees it as his duty (and 
humanity’s duty) to make sure that the posthuman hybrids survive and thrive. And Dr. 
                                                
9 And, specifically, this “idea” of the human is the Liberal, atomistic version, not a universal conception. 
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Singh also finds his own life purpose as he attempts to unravel the mystery of Gus’s 
“birth” at the cabin where Gus grew up: 
The possibilities…the potential that Gus and his wonderful mystery have 
brought into my life again…I haven’t allowed myself to feel like this in so 
very long. I feel guilty even thinking this, but I never could have imagined 
that it would take unimaginable pain, suffering and loss for me to truly 
find my place in the world […] This is where I’ll save the world.  
(ellipses original unless bracketed, Animal Armies 39-40) 
What Singh does not know at the time, is that he will “save the world” but not by curing 
the pestilence as he imagines. He remarkably withstands the virus and eventually helps 
the hybrids start their ecotopian community, teaching medicine and other essential 
survival skills. The suffering and loss were not only essential for him to find his own 
purpose, but also for the creation of a new existence where the world is saved, not 
necessarily humans—or, not humans as we currently know them. And humanity must not 
only take on the role of protecting the posthuman, but it must also take responsibility for 
the “plague” that kills off their current existence. As Becky tells Gus, “You didn’t do 
anything wrong. We did…humans, I mean. Whatever happened here…whatever caused 
you and the sick…it was us” (ellipses original, 120). Taken allegorically, the comic thus 
reinforces the role of the human in not only its own demise, but also its potential role in 
reconceiving the human and building a new existence of relationality and 
interconnectedness with the rest of the environment.  
 In Chris Boehm’s look at the post-apocalyptic television show The Walking Dead, 
he notes the ways it “illustrates that utopia is not necessarily a materially-constituted 
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social order (the dream of a “city on the hill” or a lost Eden), but … a perpetual 
willingness to become zombie, to see from the point of exclusion, in order to start over 
again and build it better the next time” (140). He sees these “apocalyptic utopias” as 
places to enact radical social change, a willingness to admit to failure and try again. Lucy 
Sargisson calls this transgressive utopianism:  
[These utopias] are spaces in which we can begin to think differently, play 
with alternatives, explore ideas to their limits—and from which, perhaps, 
we can approach the world with a fresh viewpoint. Utopias permit us 
radically to change the way that we think. Once that process has begun, 
we can, perhaps, begin to act in ways that are sustainably different. (140) 
The posthuman utopia of Sweet Tooth is just such a transgressive vision, as it offers a 
new way of conceiving of the human and our relationship with the world around (and 
inside) us. It kills off the construction of the species as we know it today and gives it new 
life in the posthuman body of the hybrid.  In Dr. Singh’s words: “There will be pain and 
death. And from it new life will spring” (Wild Game 115).  
 
A Hybrid Future 
Really what the book was about was what came after the plague: 
This new race, this new species, and what they meant for mankind 
and what they represent. I was always more interested where the 
kids ended up than revealing the mystery of “this is how it 
happened.” 
(Lemire, “The End of ‘Sweet Tooth’”) 
 
What is ultimately most valuable about the human-animal hybrid figure is its 
ability to break us from our atomistic conceptions of the human condition and to re-
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embed ourselves within our living, agential environment. The pluralistic approach to 
identity and self that the hybrids of Sweet Tooth exhibit offers an alternative: the 
posthuman consciousness. In embracing this posthuman consciousness, the hybrids are 
both anchored through the human-based historicity of their emergence and freed from the 
isolation of human exceptionalism and the limitations of binaristic thinking. Just like the 
ferals of Inhuman, the hybrids are able to unleash their full potentials and embrace their 
wilder natures just as they are reconnected with their earth others. As Gus told his 
children: “we took to the land. And it embraced us. … For the first time we felt free” 
(Wild Game 173).10 And by maintaining the plurality of self and identity evident in this 
posthuman consciousness, they also avoid the holistic Self-Other assimilation trap that 
Sargisson warns against.  
This conscious recognition of both the differences and similarities humans share 
with other animals, coupled with an acknowledgement of our co-constitutive roles in a 
trans-corporeal world, can offer us a new direction—a new hybrid future—that 
reconnects us with our posthuman selves. By following the hybrids’ example, perhaps we 
can attain this posthuman, hybrid consciousness without growing antlers. Sweet Tooth 
imagines a unique ecotopia that provides opportunities for critique of the Self-Other 
binaries, while maintaining recognition and respect for the reality of difference. And, 
while one could look closely at why these hybrids came about, and the moralistic and 
idealistic structures of religion within the comic, as the quote from Lemire above 
indicates, this isn’t what the hybrids are really about. It is not the how that matters, it’s, as 
Jepperd says to Gus at the conclusion of the series, “It’s what happens next that really 
                                                
10 The qualification of “felt” here also further anchors them historically and practically, as with this connectivity comes responsibility 
and mindfulness, thus not necessarily “freedom.” 
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matters” (Wild Game 101). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Only by welcoming uncertainty from the get-go can we acclimate 
ourselves to the shattering wonder that enfolds us. (Abram 8) 
 
 In this thesis, and throughout my research with human-animal hybrid figures, two 
primary themes arose: horror and utopia. The hybrid figure’s visually arresting 
composition and its proposed uncertainty of category and identity make it a highly 
provocative figure that produces passionate responses—both positive and negative. With 
the connectivity and embeddedness it represents one can find a pleasurable sense of 
belonging and kinship with earth others, and the earth itself. But these very components 
also threaten the constructed uniqueness of humans, instigating a horrified retreat from 
the relationality they exhibit. The three popular culture narratives analyzed here represent 
ways this combination of desire and fear can be harnessed to capture the attentions of an 
array of audiences, provoking discussion and, perhaps, a re-envisioning of the human. In 
this way, the hybrid figure can be seen as exhibiting utopian horror—a horror that can be 
employed to draw attention to critical issues like the human animal relationship, and to 
thus direct us towards new, more positive, iterations of the “human.” And one such 
conception, embodying connectivity and the acceptance of uncertainty, is the 
posthuman—an understanding of the human as already enmeshed in trans-corporeal 
relationships with the rest of the world. 
 The particular establishment of these narratives within a speculative science-
fiction tradition and the very real context of chimera research further prevents flippant 
disregard for their messages and demands the ontological, epistemological, and ethical 
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issues they embody be seriously considered. The combinative vulnerability and power 
these figures exhibit also prevents both the “rush to embrace” the “primitive and pure 
other” as an existential cure, as well as the human exceptionalist vertical retreat (escape) 
from nature (Wolfe 17; “Discomforting Creatures”). While the constructedness of the 
atomistic “human” as we currently know it can be seen as a restrictive “cage,” the 
uncaging of the posthuman plurality of self must be coupled with an acknowledgement of 
responsibility and mindfulness. When we recognize ourselves to be inherently embedded 
in complex relationships with other species we must be continually mindful of these 
connections and the positive (and negative) roles we, and other animals, can play. Seeing 
from the plural positionalities of the posthuman, then, is to embody these relationships 
and to embrace the fluid, agential, and co-constitutive world inside and around us. 
 The simultaneous self-other identification and acknowledgement (and value) of 
difference that characterizes this hybrid envisioning of the posthuman can thus also be a 
productive place to interrogate other binaristic and restrictive constructions. As indicated 
particularly with my analysis of Dren in Chapter 2, the hybrid can not only embody the 
animal other, but also a variety of other traditionally marginalized figures, in her case: the 
woman, child, and specimen. Thus, future work with the posthuman hybrid can look at 
the ways it operates at the junctures of these other “binaristic” identities: gender, race, 
age, ability, etc. Looking at the ways the proliferation of hybrids draws out fears of these 
other “others” can provide a fruitful place to interrogate these fears and to build more 
inclusive and positive relationships between bodies. 
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